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1. Donald Trump, commenting during the 2016 Republican presidential
primaries on his proposed cuts to the Environmental Protection Agency’s
budget. See Kyle Feldscher, Trump Says He’d Eliminate ‘Department of Environment Protection,’ WASH. EXAMINER (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www
.washingtonexaminer.com/trump-says-hed-eliminate-department-of
-environment-protection/article/2584908.
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INTRODUCTION
Calls to cut regulatory-agency budgets have rung through
the halls of the Capitol and statehouses continuously for well
over three decades.2 They have never resonated more loudly
than in the 2016 presidential election.3 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been a favorite target, with Congress
trying to restrain its activities both by legislation and, less directly, by reducing the agency’s resources.4 As one would expect,
interest groups fall on both sides of the fence when budget cuts
are in the air. Pro-regulatory interests generally warn of dire
consequences for the public. The Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC) decried EPA’s budget reductions in 2011 as “a
contract on America masquerading as a spending bill. It’s nothing short of a declaration of war on our most basic health protections. It would do away with fundamental safeguards that keep
our air, water and lands clean.” 5 The Center for Effective Government similarly assailed Congress’s proposed EPA budget for
2015:

2. See, e.g., Clinton Takes Aim at Bureaucracy, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 11, 1993),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1993-02-11/news/9303177668_1_cuts
-committees-and-subcommittees-congressional-leaders; Mark Landler & Annie
Lowry, Obama Bid to Cut the Government Tests Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/14/us/politics/obama-to-ask-congress
-for-power-to-merge-agencies.html; Sean Murphy, Oklahoma Governor Orders
Agencies To Prepare for Budget Cuts, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www
.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/oct/26/oklahoma-governor-orders-agencies-to
-prepare-for-b.
3. See, e.g., Gary Fineout, Jeb Bush Vows to Cut Spending, Lobbying, BOS.
GLOBE (July 21, 2015), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/07/20/bush
-vows-cut-spending-washington-lobbing/1Hk9xP6IPBjfH52DVImySN/story
.html; Heather Haddon, Donald Trump Vows To Slash Funding for Education,
EPA, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald
-trump-vows-to-slash-funding-for-education-epa-1452551107.
4. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Faces Bigger Tasks, Smaller Budgets
and Louder Critics, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2016), http://nytimes.com/2016/03/19/
us/politics/epa-faces-bigger-tasks-smaller-budgets-and-louder-critics.html;
Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, E.P.A. and Public Broadcasting Are on
House Republicans’ List for Deep Cuts, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www
.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/us/politics/12congress.html; Janet Hook et al., GOP
Wins Deep Cuts in Environment Spending, WALL STREET J., Apr. 13, 2011, at
A4.
5. House Panel’s Spending Bill Threatens Public Health Protections,
NRDC (July 6, 2011), http://www.nrdc.org/media/2011/110706. As Joel Mintz
has concluded, “any form of budget cutting in EPA’s severely understaffed enforcement program is likely to have an adverse effect on the robustness and
effectiveness of the Agency’s critical enforcement work.” Joel Mintz, Cutting
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In a continuing effort to dismantle the ability of the [EPA] to protect
public health and the environment, Congress is poised to adopt a fiscal
year 2015 budget that would reduce the agency’s funding for the fifth
year in a row. The $60 million cut in EPA’s budget, which builds on
previous reductions, will bring the agency’s staffing to its lowest level
since 1989. These funding cuts are not surprising, given that anti-regulatory forces in Congress have made clear their intent to use the
budget process to block EPA’s work. 6

There is no question that budget-cutting initiatives,
whether aimed at specific agencies or the regulatory state in general, have gone far beyond rhetoric to impose real impacts on
agency resources. For example, the Obama Administration acquiesced to significant personnel cuts in 2013 and 2014 as part
of the broader sequestration initiative across government agencies.7 The long-term trends in EPA personnel and inflation-adjusted budget tracked in Chart 1 show a generally static or
slightly falling level of total resources from 1990 through 2013,
with diminishing resources dominating the picture since 1998.8
The EPA’s experience matches a history of similar declines in
other agencies.9

EPA’s Enforcement Budget: What It Might Mean, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE RECPRBLOG (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.progressivereform.org/
CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=A6A2E941-98B3-8007-9CEEB42458BED78E.
6. Ronald White, Congress Slashes EPA Budget Again Despite Strong Public Support for Strengthening Health Protections, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T
(Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.foreffectivegov.org/blog/congress-slashes-epa
-budget-again-despite-strong-public-support-strengthening-health-protection.
7. See Andy Medici, Government Cuts 84,500 Federal Employees in Three
Years, FED. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.federaltimes.com/management/
leadership/2015/01/20/government-cuts-84500-federal-employees-in-three
-years; Matthew Yglesias, The Idiocy of Sequestration, SLATE (Jan. 30, 2013),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2013/01/what_is_
sequestration_the_budget_cuts_will_slam_government_spending_yet.html.
8. CHRISTOPHER SELLERS ET AL., ENVTL. DATA & GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, PT. 1, THE EPA UNDER SIEGE: TRUMP’S ASSAULT IN HISTORY AND TESTIMONY
23–24 (2017), https://envirodatagov.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/
06/Part-1-EPA-Under-Siege.pdf; see EPA’s Budget and Spending, EPA, https://
www.epa.gov/planandbudget/budget (last visited Nov. 4, 2017) (reporting EPA’s
budget and spending data).
9. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
budget decreased six percent from 2002 to 2012 (when adjusted for inflation).
See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42542, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT (HUD): FUNDING TRENDS SINCE FY2002, at 1 (2016), http://www
.everycrsreport.com/reports/R42542.html. The Department of Interior ’s workforce shrunk 8.2% from 2006 to 2015; the Department of Agriculture’s workforce
shrunk 8.7% from 2006 to 2015. See U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., SIZING UP
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: FISCAL YEAR 2015 tbl.3 (2016).
FORM:

698

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:695

Chart 1: EPA Budget and Employees 1991–2013

The charge by the NRDC and Center for Effective Government is straightforward: limiting EPA’s resources will make it
less effective and, as a result, will worsen the pollution of our air,
water, and lands. 10 The connections are easy to draw. It seems
intuitive that reducing resources means fewer personnel and inspections for compliance monitoring, fewer enforcement actions,
less deterrent effect, and therefore more violations that harm the
environment.11 It means fewer resources for permitting, drafting
new regulations, and revising existing regulations. Indeed, according to the Center for Effective Government, EPA’s strategic
plan to balance its budget in 2014 called for a forty to fifty percent reduction in inspection and enforcement cases. 12 One might
call this future an Age of Austerity, one of doing less with less.

10. As former EPA Deputy Administrator, Bob Perciasepe, describes,
“EPA’s budget in 1990 for example was $5.5 billion and that would be $10.1
[b]illion in 2016 with inflation to just do the same work. EPA[’]s 2016 budget is
$8.1 [b]illion and that includes implementing the Safe Drinking Water Act and
the Food Quality Protection acts in 1996 and the new TSCA [Toxic Substances
Control Act] this year. EPA had 16,300 employees in 1990 and they have 15,300
in 2016.” E-mail from Bob Perciasepe, President, Ctr. for Climate & Energy
Sols., to authors (Oct. 16, 2016, 16:02 PDT) (on file with authors).
11. See Joel A. Mintz, “Running on Fumes”: The Development of New EPA
Regulations in an Era of Scarcity, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. 10510, 10511–12 (2016).
12. White, supra note 6.
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There is, however, a competing narrative. Terry Anderson,
the noted “free market environmentalist,” 13 argues that “if lawmakers are looking for an agency in which to cut spending without causing harm to the environment, the EPA is a great place
to start.” 14 Anderson and others championing agency budget
cuts defend their actions as trimming fat from the bureaucracy. 15 This was one of the central themes behind Congress’s
haircut strategy of sequestration—cutting equal amounts from
all agencies.16 Increasing agency budgets is far more likely, they
imply, to promote bureaucracy than improvements in regulatory
outcomes, such as environmental quality in EPA’s case. This
strategy centers on doing more with less.
Which narrative is accurate—will budget cuts harm environmental quality or have no impact? To bolster his side of the
argument, Anderson graphed EPA’s inflation-adjusted budget
against measures of air quality for selected pollutants, shown in
Chart 2 below. 17 Despite a flat or declining budget, Anderson’s
chart shows air quality steadily improving over three decades.
This is not what one would expect from the doing less with less
dystopia.

13. Terry Anderson, PROP. & ENVTL. RES. CTR. (PERC), www.perc.org/staff/
terry-anderson (last visited Nov. 4, 2017).
14. Terry Anderson, EPA Budget Cuts: Reducing Bureaucracy, Not Environmental Quality, PERC: THE PERCOLATOR, http://www.perc.org/blog/epa
-budget-cuts-reducing-bureaucracy-not-environmental-quality (last visited
Nov. 4, 2017) [hereinafter EPA Budget Cuts].
15. See id. (“Such data suggest that increasing the EPA's budget . . . will
only increase bureaucracy, not air quality.”).
16. See Jonathan Weisman, Answers to Questions on Capital’s Top Topic,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/22/us/politics/
questions-and-answers-about-the-sequester.html.
17. EPA Budget Cuts, supra note 14.
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Chart 2: Air Quality and EPA Budget

The explanation for Anderson’s chart—why steady and declining agency resources appear to correlate with clear and continuous improvements in air quality—is far from obvious. To be
sure, all the chart shows is a correlation, and environmental policy experts no doubt could offer alternative causal explanations.
Perhaps the reductions in pollutants would have been even more
rapid had EPA been provided more resources. Perhaps EPA internally allocated more resources to air quality while other environmental quality goals, such as protection of drinking water,
suffered by comparison. One could even argue that the chart, rather than proving EPA is a bloated agency, actually shows EPA
is quite effective, continuing to knock down air pollution levels
while receiving no additional or even fewer resources. Or perhaps EPA’s budget does not matter so much after all. To know
which of these very different explanations is most on target
turns on one fundamental question: What is the relationship between the funding levels provided to regulatory agencies and the
social-welfare outcomes they are charged with delivering?
The crux of that question—how does more or less funding
move the needle on outcomes—is asked and answered routinely
throughout the private sector. Every budget cycle, companies
must determine how most effectively to allocate their funds to
grow the bottom line. Managers must decide whether to increase
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budgets for research and development (R&D) and manufacturing, for example, or decrease for marketing. Similar questions
about the dynamic linkage between funding and outcomes also
lie at the core of research into most fields of social importance.
What is the relationship between police funding and crime? How
does health care spending influence medical outcomes? What is
the significance of school funding on test scores? In these sectors
and many others, researchers devote a great deal of time and
effort to examining the relationship between resources and results. 18 Yet virtually no research has considered this relationship in the context of regulatory agencies.
The most basic question about agency resources and outcomes—are we getting what we pay for?—remains informed
largely by anecdotes and political sound bites. Leading Republican candidates during the 2016 presidential primaries repeatedly denounced regulatory agencies, with Donald Trump calling
for dramatic reduction of EPA’s budget and Ted Cruz promising
to eliminate four cabinet agencies were he to become president. 19
Democratic candidates ridiculed their proposals. 20 But neither
side offered any robust evidence of what would happen to regulatory outcomes if funding were to move in either direction.
To take the example of EPA, do greater EPA resources actually lead to better environmental protection efforts? If so, to what
extent do these regulatory efforts then lead to improved environmental quality in the field? Is the converse true, with reduced
resources leading to poorer environmental quality? Which aspects of environmental quality are most at risk from reduced
EPA resources and which are less vulnerable to backsliding?

18. See infra Part I.
19. Igor Bobic, Donald Trump Would Cut Department of Education, EPA,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 18, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donald
-trump-epa-education_us_56240035e4b02f6a900cc0e7; Oliver Milman, Republican Candidates’ Calls To Scrap EPA Met with Skepticism by Experts, GUARDIAN (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/feb/
26/republican-candidates-donald-trump-eliminate-epa-law-experts; see Amber
Phillips, Four Federal Agencies President Ted Cruz Could Do Without, WASH.
POST (July 24, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/07/
24/four-federal-agencies-president-ted-cruz-could-do-without/z?utm_term=
.4aa88982a5f5.
20. See, e.g., Evan Lehmann, Trump, Clinton Argue over Climate Change,
SCI. AM. (Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trump
-clinton-argue-over-climate-change.
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We focus on EPA in this Article because it has a clear overarching agency goal—environmental protection—that is measurable. 21 Our findings, however, are broadly applicable across
the administrative state. The empirical questions we address
have important theoretical and practical implications for all regulatory agencies. Indeed, these implications are heightened,
given the antiregulatory stance of the Trump administration. 22
Moreover, these questions will become increasingly important, no matter who occupies the White House. 23 They deserve serious study, not the current state of sweeping ideological
claims from politicians and interest groups on both sides of the
debate. But how would one go about addressing these questions?
That is the ambitious aim of this Article.
This Article lays the groundwork for a new field of theoretical and empirical research, using what we call the “regulatory
production function,” to understand more clearly the effects of
incremental changes (reductions or increases) in regulatoryagency budgets on the levels of benefits they produce. To ensure
our theory is grounded, we present a case study using EPA as
the regulatory agency and environmental quality as the targeted
social welfare outcome. But our theoretical framework and empirical findings have important implications across the regulatory state on the relationship between agency funding and outcomes for public health, safety, and welfare agencies.

21. While the data on agency performance are hardly plentiful at EPA, the
data that EPA regularly compiles and makes available (at least for certain air
pollutants) are superior to comparable information at other agencies.
22. For example, his nominee to head the Department of Energy, Rick
Perry, had as a presidential candidate called for the elimination of the agency.
See Coral Davenport, Rick Perry, Ex-Governor of Texas, Is Trump’s Pick as Energy Secretary, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/
13/us/politics/rick-perry-energy-secretary-trump.html.
23. The simple math of discretionary spending means that money available
for regulatory agencies will likely continue to be tight in the coming decades.
Absent radical legislative reform, increases in future spending for Social Security and Medicare are built-in. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, MEDICARE-CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE’S JUNE 2017 BASELINE 1 (2017), http://www
.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/recurringdata/51302-2017-06-medicare.pdf. Therefore, for agency budgets to stay level, one of the following must occur: (1) an
increase in federal revenues, which would likely require higher taxes; (2) an
increase in deficits; (3) a fall in discretionary spending; or (4) some combination
of the first three. Regardless of the exact combination, the likelihood of significant increases in EPA’s and other regulatory agencies’ budgets seems low for
the foreseeable future.
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Part I opens by describing relevant scholarship on the relationship between government resources and outcomes, showing
the paucity of theoretical and empirical analysis, particularly
with respect to regulatory agencies. To begin to fill the theoretical void, Part II introduces the production function concept and
how it can provide a framework to think more clearly about the
linkages between agency funding and regulatory outcomes. To
demonstrate the usefulness of the model, Part III uses it to develop a set of hypotheses that could explain why EPA funding
levels may or may not have a significant effect on environmental
quality. Part IV introduces an empirical component, assessing
what the available data can tell us about the relationship between agency funding and environmental benefits. Using regression analysis, we do not find statistically significant correlations
between the EPA or state agency funding levels and air pollution, but major data constraints limit the strength of these analyses.
Part V then explores the important research questions that
emerge from the regulatory production function model and our
empirical findings. The administrative state has developed and
come to rely heavily on sophisticated cost-benefit analysis for
evaluating specific policy proposals. As valuable as it is for those
purposes, cost-benefit analysis provides little insight into the
complex budget-outcome relationship. A new mode of analysis is
needed, and new forms of data, including comparative, time series, and experimental studies, must be compiled. With this in
hand, a whole series of important research questions comes into
focus. Consider the following, for example:
(1) How would Congress or the agency know which are its
most cost-effective budget investments going forward, or
where to make the next round of cuts?
(2) How should an agency manage its activities in an
extended period of austerity?
(3) What role do resources play in maintaining agency
resilience and how can this be assessed?
(4) Is there a difference as to how an agency might respond
to budget cuts compared to budget increases?
(5) Are there other institutions, public or private, that could
provide more bang for the buck were funding diverted to
them from the incumbent agency?
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These and related questions are of the first importance, yet cannot be answered by current methods of analysis and data compilations. Part V thus closes by setting forth the major components
and approaches of a new analytic tool that will help inform
agency-scale decisions regarding institutional design and instrument choice. It also delineates the broader set of decisions regarding federalism and reliance on private governance as a supplement to public authority.
Decades ago, scholars proposed greater agency reliance on
cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment to guide agency actions. At the time, this must have seemed ridiculously ambitious,
given the complexity of the issues and the simplicity of the tools.
Over time, however, these tools have been developed into important contributors to agency management. We argue that the
regulatory production function should follow the same trajectory.
The relationship between agency resources and regulatory
outcomes is fundamental and complex. It goes to the very heart
of regulatory policy, which explains why politicians and interest
groups take strong positions about how it works. Yet it remains
woefully underdeveloped theoretically and understudied empirically. This Article provides the first step in laying an intellectual foundation to address these shortcomings and set out future
avenues for research.
I. SCHOLARSHIP EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN AGENCY RESOURCES AND OUTCOMES
As discussed in the Introduction, the relationship between
public funding and outcomes has long been an active field of research in a wide range of social sciences. For example, many
scholars have examined the relationship between public spending on education and student academic achievement. 24 The vast
24. See, e.g., ULRICH BOSER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, RETURN ON EDUCAINVESTMENT: 2014, at 1–2 (2014), http://cdn.americanprogress
.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/ROI-report.pdf (comparing academic achievement, as measured by the percentage of students scoring proficiently on state
exams, with the educational spending of school districts, while controlling for
factors including the cost of living and student poverty); ANDREW J. COULSON,
CATO INST., STATE EDUCATION TRENDS: ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE AND SPENDING OVER THE PAST 40 YEARS 1 (2014), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/
pubs/pdf/pa746.pdf (using a time-series regression approach to adjust state SAT
score averages for factors including participation rate and student demographics from 1972 to the present. The study then compares these adjusted
SAT scores with the raw SAT scores and inflation-adjusted per-pupil spending
TIONAL
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majority find that increasing educational spending does not, on
its own, improve student achievement. 25 Other research has focused on the relationship between police funding and crime
rates. The findings have not been uniform, with some studies
showing that crime rates are positively correlated with police
funding (suggesting that higher crime rates trigger greater funding) and others that increases in police levels tend to reduce
crime at the local level.26 Significant research efforts have also
to examine the link between education funding and outcomes); Rob Greenwald,
Larry V. Hedges & Richard D. Laine, The Effect of School Resources on Student
Achievement, 66 REV. EDUC. RES. 361, 361 (1996) (analyzing a comprehensive
collection of sixty school funding and achievement studies that have been performed, and using combined significance analysis and effect magnitude estimation to determine the relationship between three variables—public expenditures (i.e., per-pupil spending), teacher background characteristics (e.g.,
certification, educational history, and ability), and class/school sizes—and the
standardized test scores considered by the surveyed articles); Emiliana Vegas
& Chelsea Coffin, When Education Expenditure Matters: An Empirical Analysis
of Recent International Data, 59 COMP. EDUC. REV. 289, 291–95 (2015) (comparing per capita GDP, per pupil educational spending, and learning outcomes, as
measured by mean scores in mathematics and reading as reported by the Program for International Student Assessment).
25. Instead of simply increasing aggregate funding, the studies suggest
moderate increases in funding on specific resources could greatly improve student achievement (such as reducing class sizes, school sizes, and improving the
quality of teachers). For studies of school funding using a production function
model, see infra note 62.
26. See Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, Specification Problems,
Police Levels, and Crime Rates, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 609, 623–24 (1996) (comparing
the number of police employees around the country divided by population with
crime rates for the seven crime types and finding it makes little difference
whether police expenditures are considered in place of police employees because
the two factors are strongly correlated and because the bulk of police expenditures are for personnel); Thomas F. Pogue, Effect of Police Expenditures on
Crime Rates: Some Evidence, 3 PUB. FIN. Q. 14, 15–17 (1975) (exploring the relationship between public spending on law enforcement and the rate of criminal
activity, as measured by the proportion of arrests to crime reported in the FBI’s
index of serious crime, across metropolitan areas); Ben Vollaard & Joseph
Hamed, Why the Police Have an Effect on Violent Crime After All: Evidence from
the British Crime Survey, 55 J.L. & ECON. 901, 902–05 (2012) (exploring the
relationship between police funding and crime in the U.K. by, first, assuming
that police funding levels are tied to the crime rate, and then considering factors
including: police funding, the number of police personnel, crime rates as recorded by the police, and crime rates as deduced by police staffing and police
funding levels); Ashish Yadav & Paul D. Berger, On the Relationship Between
Police Funding and Crime Rates, 2 INT’L J. INNOVATION RES. 1, 2 (2015) (evaluating the link between police funding and crime by comparing the following
factors across fifty small cities in the United States: total reported crime, reported violent crime, annual police funding per resident, and educational attainment of residents below and above age twenty-five).
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addressed the relationship between health care spending and
health outcomes. These studies tend to show that increasing
public spending on healthcare improves quality of life by, for example, reducing infant and childhood mortality. Some studies,
though, find that differences between state expenditures on
healthcare have little effect on infant mortality rates between
different states.27
Of course, there are important differences between direct
funding of police, doctors, or teachers and funding a regulatory
agency like EPA. Funding for EPA and other regulatory agencies
has a less direct relationship to outcomes than do these other
social-welfare funding programs. For example, many of the
funds spent to produce improved environmental quality are
spent not by EPA but by regulated parties as they invest labor
and capital to comply with EPA mandates. EPA’s success thus
depends in large part on how regulated parties behave.28 That
said, it is reasonable to assume that agency resources matter at
least to some degree in that regard. And the scale of agency resources surely is meaningful outside the environmental field.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Occupational Safety

27. See Marwa Farag et al., Health Expenditures, Health Outcomes and the
Role of Good Governance, 13 INT’L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. & ECON. 33, 33 (2013)
(examining the relationship between public health spending and health outcomes, including infant and child mortality, in 133 low- and middle-income
countries for the years 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2006); Richard Heijink, Xander
Koolman & Gert P. Westert, Spending More Money, Saving More Lives? The
Relationship Between Avoidable Mortality and Healthcare Spending in 14
Countries, 14 EUR. J. HEALTH ECON. 527, 527 (2013) (comparing the growth of
the proportion of healthcare spending to GDP with “avoidable mortality” in fourteen western countries, based on data from 1996 to 2006); David R. Morgan &
James T. LaPlant, The Spending-Service Connection: The Case of Health Care,
24 POL’Y STUD. J. 215, 215 (1996) (exploring the relationship between public
healthcare spending at the state and federal levels, various service measures
(e.g., the quantity of hospital beds and full-time equivalent healthcare workers)
and several health outcomes, including low infant birthweight, infant mortality,
and childhood mortality); John Nixon & Philippe Ulmann, The Relationship Between Health Care Expenditure and Health Outcomes: Evidence and Caveats for
a Causal Link, 7 EUR. J. HEALTH ECON. 7, 7 (2006) (analyzing the relationship
between healthcare expenditures and health outcomes, including life expectancy and infant mortality, for fifteen member-states of the European Union,
relying on data from 1980 to 1995).
28. See, e.g., EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970
TO 1990, at 7 (1997) (estimating the private sector ’s total direct compliance costs
of the Clean Air Act at nineteen billion dollars); EPA’s Budget and Spending,
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/planandbudget/budget (last visited Nov. 4, 2017)
(documenting EPA’s budget in 1990 at $5.46 billion).
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and Health Administration (OSHA), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Center for Disease Control (CDC), and a host of
other regulatory bodies have strong mandates to protect the public. 29 How much their funding matters to providing these protections, therefore, ought to be a question of great interest to anyone weighing in on the budgeting debate.
Nevertheless, there have been few studies examining the
practical impact of resource levels for regulatory agency outcomes. Prominent exceptions include studies of funding for securities regulation 30 and for OSHA regulation of the workplace. 31
It stands to reason that those and other regulatory agencies’
funding levels determine their effectiveness, but overall there
has been strikingly little research examining the connection between agency resources and public health, safety, and welfare
outcomes. This is most certainly true in the environmental field.
29. See, e.g., Safety: The Foundation of Everything We Do, FAA, http://www
.faa.gov/about/safety_efficiency (last updated July 24, 2017) (“We continually
strive to improve the safety and efficiency of flight in this country.”); What We
Do, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo (last updated Apr. 4, 2017)
(stating the “FDA is responsible for advancing the public health”); About OSHA,
OSHA, https://www.osha.gov/about.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2017) (stating
OSHA “assure[s] safe and healthful working conditions for working men and
women”).
30. In a comparative study across nations, Jackson and Roe found that
agency resources (budget and staff ) are a better predictor of regulatory outcomes than formal elements of regulation, arguing that increased public enforcement is an effective means of obtaining the market outcomes security regulators seek. Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement
of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 207 (2009);
see also James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 742 (2003) (arguing that SEC
resource limitations lead to insufficient enforcement); Jason Scott Johnston, A
Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for Regulatory Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 1343, 1362–63 (2002) (asserting that agency
budget decreases will reduce regulatory capacity).
31. McGarity and Shapiro’s comprehensive analysis of OSHA inspections
and workplace injuries concluded that OSHA inspections have had a greater
impact on the injury rates of inspected firms and therefore that greater funding
will increase workplace safety. They also cite an OSHA assertion that fifteen
percent budget cuts would lead to an additional 50,000 workplace injuries and
50,000 cases of occupational disease. Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro,
OSHA’s Critics and Regulatory Reform, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 597, 638
(1996); see also SIDNEY SHAPIRO ET AL., REGULATORY DYSFUNCTION: HOW INSUFFICIENT RESOURCES, OUTDATED LAWS, AND POLITICAL INTERFERENCE CRIPPLE THE ‘PROTECTOR AGENCIES’ 6 (Ctr. for Progressive Reform White Paper No.
906 2009) (arguing that the CPSC was responsible for twenty-five percent drop
in injuries caused by durable goods but following budget cuts in the Reagan
years, injury rates leveled off ).
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To be sure, regulatory agencies generate plenty of data. Taking EPA as a representative example, the agency provides a
great deal of useful data about its work and about environmental
quality. Annual reports are published on environmental quality
indicators for air, water, and solid waste,32 as well as detailed
data on inspections, enforcement actions, fines collected, technology mandated, and other sanctions. 33 The Government Performance and Results Act requires the EPA and other agencies
to submit reports to Congress identifying goals and updates on
how well it has achieved them. 34 While providing an impressive
stockpile of data, however, none of these reports assesses the relationship between funding and outcomes.
Nor have academics filled this gap. A small number of publications address aspects of this issue, but none get at the question directly and comprehensively. At a macro level, for example,
the Environmental Kuznets Curve literature has explored the
relationship between GDP and common pollutants. 35

32. See, e.g., Our Nation’s Air: Status and Trends Through 2016, EPA,
http://gispub.epa.gov/air/trendsreport/2017/#home (last visited Nov. 4, 2017)
(containing annual reports); Providing Safe Drinking Water in America: National Public Water Systems Compliance Report, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/
compliance/providing-safe-drinking-water-america-national-public-water
-systems-compliance-report (last visited Nov. 4, 2017) (containing annual reports); EPA’s Report on Environment (ROE): Quantity of Municipal Solid Waste
Generated and Managed, EPA, http://cfpub.epa.gov/roe/indicator.cfm?i=53 (last
updated July 28, 2017) (containing annual report).
33. See Enforcement Annual Results for Fiscal Year 2016, EPA, http://www
.epa.gov/enforcement/enforcement-annual-results-fiscal-year-2016 (last updated May 9, 2017).
34. See Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 10362, § 1116, 107 Stat. 285, 288. “Departments and agencies must clearly describe
the goals and objectives of their programs, identify resources and actions needed
to accomplish these goals and objectives, develop a means of measuring their
progress, and regularly report on their achievements.” Glossary of Terms: Government Performance and Results Act, EPA, https://rcrainfo.epa.gov/rcrainfo/
help/generalhelp/glossary_of_terms.htm#governmentperformance (last visited
Nov. 4, 2017). EPA’s goals and assessments, though, are quite general.
35. Across a wide range of countries, research has shown that as societal
wealth increases, there is an inflection point where pollutants decrease. The
basic explanation is that environmental quality becomes a priority once more
fundamental needs such as food and shelter have been met. This is an important
insight as an economy-wide matter, but does not provide insight into agency
funding. See, e.g., Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, Economic Growth and
the Environment, 110 Q.J. ECON. 353, 353 (1995); John A. List & Craig A. Gallet,
The Environmental Kuznets Curve: Does One Size Fit All?, 31 ECOLOGICAL
ECON. 409, 409 (1999).
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There has also been a small number of more specific articles
by economists and political scientists examining the connection
between government size and air quality, the link between public expenditures for social goods and air pollution levels, and the
connections between state-level environmental expenditures
and public-health outcomes, among others. 36
The most relevant contribution in legal scholarship is by
Victor Flatt and Paul Collins. Focusing on the state level, they
found that an increase in state environmental-agency enforcement funding led to shorter periods of noncompliance under the
Clean Air Act. 37 They treated noncompliance as a proxy for environmental quality. While a useful study and the most rigorous
examination of regulatory agency budget-outcome relationships
to date, this does not answer our research question, for the simple reason that periods of noncompliance may have little impact
on environmental quality. 38
36. Bernauer and Koubi examined the connection between government size
and air quality (as measured by sulfur dioxide concentrations) by surveying
forty-two countries from 1971 to 1996. Thomas Bernauer & Vally Koubi, Are
Bigger Governments Better Providers of Public Goods? Evidence from Air Pollution, 156 PUB. CHOICE 593, 604 (2013) (finding a positive correlation between a
government’s size and air pollution). Islam and López looked at the link between
public expenditures for social goods and air pollution levels. Asif M. Islam &
Ramón E. López, Government Spending and Air Pollution in the US, 8 INT’L
REV. ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 139, 141 (2014) (finding that shifting public
funding from private subsidies to social and public goods at the state level improves air quality, whereas the same is not true at the federal level); see also
SUSAN HUNTER & RICHARD W. WATERMAN, ENFORCING THE LAW: THE CASE OF
THE CLEAN WATER ACTS 203 (1996) (considering the relationship between state
agency organizational form and water pollution levels); Alexander C. Heckman,
Desperately Seeking Management: Understanding Management Quality and Its
Impact on Government Performance Outcomes Under the Clean Air Act, 22 J.
PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 473, 487 (2012) (finding a statistically significant
but “modest or negligible” impact from spending on environmental outcomes);
Neal D. Woods, David M. Konisky & Ann O’M. Bowman, You Get What You Pay
for: Environmental Policy and Public Health, 39 PUBLIUS 95, 103–04 (2009)
(tracking state-level environmental expenditures to public-health outcomes for
three years, finding that, all else being equal, states with stronger enforcement
and more funding have lower levels of pollution and better public health, as
shown by a composite measure of seventy environmental conditions).
37. Victor B. Flatt & Paul Collins, Jr., Environmental Enforcement in Dire
Straits: There Is No Protection for Nothing and No Data for Free, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 55, 83 (2009).
38. It may well be the case, for example, that the noncompliance by some
firms has only minimal impacts on air or water quality because other major
emitters are in compliance. To assess the relationship between periods of noncompliance and environmental quality, one would need to know more about
which parties were in noncompliance and the resulting environmental impacts.
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In short, while helpful in understanding specific aspects of
government resources and environmental outcomes, none of
these studies has focused on EPA budgeting and environmental
quality, and studies looking more broadly at other regulatory
agencies are few and far between. More fundamentally, no scholarly contributions from law, economics, political science, or other
relevant disciplines have sought to develop a theoretical framework for how one would approach studying the question for EPA
or any other regulatory agency. We propose such a model in Part
II.
II. BETWEEN AGENCY FUNDING AND OUTCOMES:
MODELING THE REGULATORY PRODUCTION FUNCTION
Terry Anderson’s macro analysis in Chart 2 found air quality improvements over an extended period of flat to declining
EPA budgets.39 But what does that prove about the relationship
between EPA’s budget and environmental quality? This is fundamentally a matter of understanding what happens between
agency funding and intended outcomes. Yet, for the most part,
the debate over EPA funding treats that space as a black box.
To be sure, cost-benefit analysis of discrete EPA regulations
and other actions, though it has its critics,40 informs us about
the relative values of different options. 41 But this method of
analysis does not speak to budget dynamics. Even aggregating
all of the cost-benefit analyses conducted for a given time period
of EPA actions would only tell us how much EPA expected to
spend on its actions and the value of the environmental quality
benefits it expected them to produce. While its explanation for
the latter would necessarily need to describe some form of causal
See generally Victor B. Flatt, A Dirty River Runs Through It (The Failure of
Enforcement in the Clean Water Act), 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (1997)
(arguing that lack of adequate EPA funding has diminished water quality
across states).
39. EPA Budget Cuts, supra note 14.
40. See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: CostBenefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1562–63
(2002) (arguing the ineffective nature of cost-benefit analysis as seen in its creation of artificial markets and devaluation through discounting); Amy Sinden,
A “Cost-Benefit State”? Reports of Its Birth Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 46
ENVTL. L. REP.: NEWS & ANALYSIS 10933, 10934–39 (2016) (discussing agencies’
abilities to consider costs through means other than cost-benefit analysis).
41. For a seminal outline of how cost-benefit analysis can be employed in
the regulatory state, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002).
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chain between its action and the change in environmental quality—for example, that factories complying with a new emissions
standard will reduce emissions by some level—that would not
provide a dynamic understanding of the relationship between
agency resources and outcomes, much less what the consequences of more or less agency funding would be going forward.
In short, understanding what happens after EPA issues the new
standard does not improve our understanding about what happens before EPA issues the new standard—from the time of funding to the promulgation of the standard—nor does it improve our
understanding regarding whether the funding dollars could have
been more effectively deployed by EPA or another actor.
To frame the challenge of our research question using a different context, consider the corporate budgeting process. Assume you are the CEO of a business and must decide next year’s
operating budget. This involves determining allocations to each
corporate division. To do this intelligently requires deciding (1)
the basic amounts needed for each division to perform its core
operations; (2) a marginal analysis of which additional dollar
above the previous year’s budget for each division will result in
the greatest contributions to the bottom line; and (3) a marginal
analysis of which dollar reduction below the previous year’s
budget for each division will minimize harm to the bottom line.
Should R&D receive a greater increase than marketing? What
about logistics? To flip the question, when the head of R&D requests her annual budget, she needs to justify why additional
resources should go to her division rather than be dedicated to
other uses, as well as why lowering her budget would harm the
company. These marginal analyses all require understanding
the firm’s production function.
Similarly, claims about whether decreasing EPA funding
will or will not affect environmental protection are at heart
claims about the production function of environmental quality.
The doing less with less position argues that EPA funding has a
significant impact on the nation’s production of environmental
quality. Those advocating the doing more with less position argue that other factors—Anderson’s chart does not identify which
factors—are more important and EPA funding can be decreased
without reducing (or perhaps while even improving) environmental protection. Indeed, these competing hypotheses dominate today’s political rhetoric regarding regulatory agency funding, yet they have not been carefully assessed.
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In this Part, we develop a more robust and complete model
of the regulatory production function, using EPA and environmental quality as the case study. In short, claims that increased
or decreased funding for EPA will or will not affect environmental quality account for only the beginning and the end of the production function: funding is a raw input and environmental quality is the final product. Quite obviously, what goes on between
those two points also matters.
A. PRODUCTION FUNCTION THEORY
Economists have developed the production function model
to examine the manner in which an output is related to the quantity and nature of inputs, also known as the factors of production,
used to create it. 42 In its most common application, the production function relates the physical output of the final products
from a production process, such as the proverbial widget, to the
physical inputs or factors of production, such as labor and raw
materials. Expressed mathematically, the production function in
its most basic form appears as such: P = f(X, Y), where P is total
product output and X and Y represent possible inputs. 43 For a
single-product firm, the production function describes the maximum output it can produce in a fixed period of time. Inputs have
been traditionally categorized as labor, capital, land, and entrepreneurship. 44 Production functions are often used to determine
how best to maximize output with a given input or minimize input for a given output.
Production functions in simple form are subject to a number
of assumptions. For instance, production functions are generally
assumed to be linearly homogenous, meaning different combinations of different quantities of X and Y inputs can produce the
same output P. 45 To illustrate this, consider a production function for potato chips wherein potatoes and labor are two of the
inputs. An increase in labor might result in more efficient peeling of the potatoes, which in turn could lead to less waste and
42. Thomas M. Humphrey, Algebraic Production Functions and Their Uses
Before Cobb-Douglas, 83 ECON. Q. 51, 51 (1997).
43. Id.
44. Gerald Beer, The Cobb-Douglas Production Function, 53 MATHEMATICS
MAG. 44, 44 (1980).
45. Udo Ebert & Heinz Welsch, Environmental Emissions and Production
Economics: Implications of the Materials Balance, 89 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 287
(2007); Edmund H. Mantell, Antinomies in Antitrust Law: Tying and Vertical
Integration, 7 J.L. & COM. 23, 35–36 (1987).
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thus lower the necessary amount of potatoes for a given level of
output. Production functions also assume the existence of an effective manager within the firm, who is able to determine how
to best maximize output given a set of inputs. 46 Adopting assumptions like these, the production function can be used to analyze issues of allocative efficiency for the firm.
While the production function’s real-world accuracy is limited by its simplifying assumptions, it is a key concept of neoclassical economics and the subject of rigorous research and refinement to produce more nuanced models that can apply beyond the
single-product firm with linear input substitution. 47 One thrust
of variation, for example, focuses on integrating variable elasticities of substitution between inputs. 48 Another well-known variation adds technological innovation, or knowledge, as a multiplier making labor and capital more productive, 49 leading some
commentators to describe innovation as “the real engine of economic growth.” 50
Yet another important multiplier that can affect output is
the intermediate-products effect. 51 Intermediate products are
outputs of one production function that serve as inputs to another product’s production function. Economists track the series
of intermediate products needed to produce the final good—the
good that is consumed or invested—to calculate gross national
income. 52 For example, natural gas, a product of its own production function, can be an intermediate product used to produce
electricity, and electricity can be an intermediate product used
in multiple other production functions leading ultimately to final
products, such as a finished automobile that is purchased by a

46. Beer, supra note 44.
47. For a lengthy discussion of some of the better-known production functions, see S K Mishra, A Brief History of Production Functions, 8 IUP J. MANAGERIAL ECON. 6 (2010).
48. Beer, supra note 44; J. Davidson Frame, National Commitment to Intellectual Property Protection: An Empirical Investigation, 2 J.L. & TECH. 209,
221–22 (1987).
49. Shi-Ling Hsu, Capital Rigidities, Latent Externalities, 51 HOUS. L. REV.
719, 721 n.2 (2014).
50. Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV.
247, 253 (2007).
51. Charles I. Jones, Intermediate Goods and Weak Links in the Theory of
Economic Development, 3 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECONOMICS 1, 1–2 (2011).
52. Thomas C. Brown et al., Defining, Valuing, and Providing Ecosystem
Goods and Services, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 329, 335–37 (2007).
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consumer. Intermediate products link production sectors (for example, natural gas production to electricity production to automobile production), thus creating the multiplier effect—greater
efficiency in producing natural gas leads to greater efficiency in
generating electricity, and so on down the chain into the other
sectors where electricity is an input.
As production becomes more complex and scales up, production-function theory runs into several complications. One such
problem is how to aggregate highly heterogeneous capital into a
single input value. Adding a robotic machine and a hammer into
the same category, called capital, strikes some commentators as
pure fiction. 53 Even more problematic is the challenge of aggregating firm-level production functions into the level of industrywide or economy-wide production functions, which many commentators argue is possible, if at all, only under the most stringent of assumptions and conditions.54 Nevertheless, production
function theory remains firmly rooted in the research agenda of
neoclassical economics.
Though it originated to analyze economic production, the
production function concept has found application in a number
of other contexts. For example, a significant amount of legal and
scientific scholarship has applied the production function to the
ecological-economics context with a particular focus on ecosystem goods and services. 55 Ecosystem services, such as the purification of water and pollination of plants, are essential to human well-being and can be thought of economically in that sense.
Ecosystem services are created by ecosystem processes wherein
physical and biological factors interact to produce what we perceive as the natural world. In other words, ecosystem services
are the output of a production function that relies purely on “natural capital.” 56 For instance, photosynthesis is the production
function that changes soil, water, and sunlight into plants. 57
53. Joan Robinson, The Production Function and the Theory of Capital,
21 REV. ECON. STUD. 81, 95 (1953).
54. Steven Pressman, What Is Wrong with the Aggregate Production Function?, 31 E. ECON. J. 422, 422 (2005).
55. Edward B. Barbier, Valuing Environmental Functions: Tropical Wetlands, 70 LAND ECON. 155, 167–71 (1994); James Boyd et al., Compensation for
Lost Ecosystem Services: The Need for Benefit-Based Transfer Ratios and Restoration Criteria, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 393, 403–06 (2001) (cited pages directly
discuss production functions); Geoffrey Heal et al., Protecting Natural Capital
Through Ecosystem Service Districts, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 357–59 (2001).
56. Brown et al., supra note 52.
57. Laurie A. Wayburn & Anton A. Chiono, The Role of Federal Policy in
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Ecosystem services may serve as intermediate product inputs of
the production functions of other ecosystem services, meaning
that impairing or promoting one ecosystem service would affect
the output of another. 58 In turn, ecosystem goods and services
can become inputs for manufactured goods and services along
with labor and built capital. Many goods and services that are
directly beneficial to human life are therefore dependent on ecosystem goods and services in some way.59 Once the production
functions of ecosystem services and their interactions are determined, therefore, more socially efficient environmental regulation can take place. 60
As an example of using production functions in social-investment contexts like the agency budget-output problem, production function analysis has also found applications in education
funding policy. Its use there may be particularly enlightening to
the agency budget-output question because it addresses the central issue of whether or not funding matters in determining educational outcomes. The earliest attempt to formulate an educational production function investigated inequalities in American
schools and sought to explain them from an input-output perspective focused on increasing output by adjusting purchasable
inputs like teacher salary and class size. 61 Study results in this
education domain have conflicted in their findings, with scholars
still heavily divided on the issue. 62
The extension of the production function concept to contexts
such as ecosystem services and education reveals both its value
and its limits. On the one hand, building the production function
model of systems, such as ecosystem services and educational
quality moves analysis, from the proverbial black box to a more
robust conceptualization of relationships between components of
Establishing Ecosystem Service Markets, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 385,
392–93 (2010).
58. Boyd et al., supra note 55.
59. Brown et al., supra note 52.
60. Heal et al., supra note 55.
61. Id.
62. See Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity
and the Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1479–82 (2007) (discussing the academic debate over educational production functions). Compare
Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance “Reform” May Not Be Good Policy, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423, 430 (1991) (finding no relationship), with Richard J.
Murnane, Interpreting the Evidence on “Does Money Matter?”, 28 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 457, 462 (1991) (finding a relationship).
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the system. In this situation, intervention, whether through regulation or funding, can most move the needle in terms of improving outcomes policy makers care about. On the other hand, building such models and putting them to the empirical test tends to
reveal how complex the systems are and how much is not known
about them. With those challenges in mind, in the next section,
we apply the basic concepts of the production function model to
the context of regulatory agency budgets.
B. REGULATORY AGENCIES AS PRODUCERS
As described above, there are important conceptual similarities between the production functions for corporations and regulatory agencies. Both seek to understand how marginal
changes of inputs will impact the respective bottom lines,
whether balance of sheets or air quality. 63 We want to make
clear at the outset, though, that determining the production
function of regulatory benefits such as environmental quality is
a great deal more complex than a single firm’s production function for widgets. There is a good reason scholars have avoided
this topic. As Clifford Rechtschaffen has cautiously observed,
“Causality between program activities and outcomes is usually
impossible to prove. Outcomes cannot generally be attributed to
individual functions of an agency or program. ‘Prevention’ or deterrence of undesired outcomes is difficult to measure.” 64
Building a comprehensive model may well be beyond our
scope and grasp, but building even a simple model would represent a major improvement over the current superficial debate of
funding = benefits versus funding ≠ benefits. Our efforts below
represent a starting point for generating hypotheses in Part III
to explain why the relationship between agency funding and social-welfare outcomes is as complicated as Rechtschaffen posits
and why EPA funding may have a less influential role in the production of environmental quality than the doing less with less
position asserts.
As a starting point, despite its complex appearance, the figure below sets out a simplified model of the key factors affecting
63. See generally Humphrey, supra note 42 (discussing the production function model and its examination of the relationship between outputs and inputs).
64. Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving
Theory of Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1272 n.390
(1998) (quoting EPA, MEASURING THE PERFORMANCE OF EPA’S ENFORCEMENT
AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAM, DRAFT REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES STRATEGY (Sept. 1997)).
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air quality and how the factors interact with one another. Beyond EPA action, these include the actions of Congress, state
governments, and nongovernmental organizations; technological innovation; and economic activity. In addition, it is likely that
some of these factors have an extended effect over time, and indeed may have a greater effect only once some time has passed.
Our point here is not to claim that we have captured exactly how
environmental quality is determined—to the contrary, we believe the flowchart certainly oversimplifies matters—but rather
to show the broad schematics of the dynamic.
Figure 1

We are seeing this dynamic play out in the early stages of
the Trump Administration. With threats of reduced EPA funding by Congress and the President, some states have proclaimed
plans to increase their activities to protect the environment, 65
and donations to environmental groups that pledge to fight the
65. See Adam Nagourney & Henry Fountain, California, at Forefront of Climate Fight, Won’t Back Down to Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/12/26/us/california-climate-change-jerry-brown-donald
-trump.html (discussing California’s climate initiative and desire to work with
other nations and states to fight climate change).
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new administration in the courts have increased.66
In addition to the range of actors involved and their influence on one another, it is also important to recognize the vectors.
EPA, for example, influences air quality through its production
of regulations, policies, and enforcement, among other actions.
These can be thought of as intermediate products in the production of environmental quality because they are produced between raw inputs (funding) and the final product (air quality).
These are critical to production of the final product, but are part
of the production chain, not the final product. In most cases,
therefore, EPA does not use funding to produce environmental
quality directly; it first has to produce intermediate products
such as regulations, monitoring tools, education programs, and
so on. EPA and other institutions then use these intermediate
products to continue down the production chain until some actor
or action changes conditions that directly change environmental
quality, such as reducing emissions or restoring a wetland area.
For example, a new EPA regulation could be enforced by a state
agency that issues a permit requiring an industrial facility to install technology to reduce air emissions. When emissions fall,
that is when environmental quality changes, not EPA receiving
funding or issuing the rule. The central role of intermediate
products is equally true for other governance institutions, such
as states and counties.
Acknowledging the numerous institutions and intermediate
products involved in the production of environmental quality is
not a new revelation. The problem is that rarely do academics or
practitioners step back to ask how the system as a whole works.
In fact, quite the opposite: they tend to focus on the production
and performance of intermediate products rather than the production of environmental quality, the latter being what they really should care about. This is a critically important point.
Agencies, scholars, and politicians weighing in on the EPA’s
role in the production of environmental quality generally focus
on the EPA’s production of intermediate products and how they
perform. 67 The EPA’s strategic plans set goals for regulations
66. See John O’Connell, Election Provides Fundraising Windfall for Environmental Organizations, CAPITAL PRESS (Jan. 19, 2017), http://www
.capitalpress.com/Nation_World/Nation/20170119/election-provides-fund
-raising-windfall-for-environmental-organizations (discussing the inflow of financial support for environmentalist groups, along with the desire to use the
courts to make public the tax awards to successful claims).
67. See, e.g., William F. Pedersen, Jr., Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly,

2017] THE REGULATORY PRODUCTION FUNCTION

719

promulgated, rules reviewed, companies inspected, or sanctions
enforced.68 Cost-benefit analysis and risk assessments scrutinize proposed agency regulations and policies.69 Litigation challenges intermediate products such as regulations and permits. 70
These are all important activities, so one can understand the focus on intermediate products. Agency offices, for example, can
directly control intermediate products such as regulations but
cannot directly control air quality or water quality since there
are too many intervening factors. The problem is that a myopic
focus on intermediate products risks missing what really matters—whether pollution in the environment is increasing or decreasing. To coopt a metaphor, agencies, scholars, and politicians
are focusing on intermediate product trees rather than the environmental quality forest.
From a budgeting perspective, however, it is vital to scrutinize not only how agencies produce intermediate products, but
how the system works overall—how agencies and other institutions take the raw input of upstream funding to produce intermediate products that are used downstream to produce environmental quality (or not). Moreover, as we shall discuss in Part V,
it is equally as important to consider how the various intermediate products compare, not only within the agency, but also across
129 U. PA. L. REV. 1059, 1063 (1981) (discussing EPA efforts that it expects will
result in pollution control); Press Release, Representative Lamar Smith, House
Comm. on Sci., Space, & Tech., Smith Criticizes EPA Methane Rule (May 12,
2016).
68. See, e.g., EPA, FY 2014–2018 EPA STRATEGIC PLAN 54 (2014) (detailing
annual performance measures that aid in the achievement of EPA’s goals). The
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 had a larger goal in mind,
requiring agencies to develop five-year strategic plans that set long-term goals
for the agency’s major functions, set performance measures, and report results.
Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993), as amended by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-352 (2011). In the case of EPA, however, the goals have been
largely qualitative and focused on intermediate products. See, e.g., EPA, OFFICE
OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2013,
at 5–9 (2014), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/
epa_oig_annual_performance_report_fy_2013.pdf (detailing the EPA’s themes
and goals for the year).
69. See, e.g., EPA, OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS
OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT FROM 1990 TO 2020, at 7-1 (2011), https://www.epa.gov/
sites/production/files/2015-07/documents/fullreport_rev_a.pdf (predicting the
likelihood, though uncertain, that benefits of the Clean Air Act will exceed
costs).
70. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (holding that
EPA, when deciding to regulate power plants, unreasonably considered cost to
be irrelevant).
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institutions. Perhaps a corporate training program or state
agency information-disclosure program could improve pollution
reduction outcomes more efficiently than does an EPA inspection
program. In short, one cannot reasonably understand the relationship between regulatory agency funding and the outcomes
without studying the larger production function—the entire system, both upstream and downstream—from budget, to intermediate products, to environmental quality.
Understanding how environmental quality is produced,
though, is easier said than done. It is a complex function, in the
true sense of the term. To understand why, in Part III we open
the black box and look inside.
III. UNPACKING THE REGULATORY PRODUCTION
FUNCTION
In Part II, we sketched a simplified model of how environmental quality is produced and identified the importance of intermediate products at EPA and other institutions use their inputs to produce. Most research and measures of agency success
tend to focus on the production and performance of discrete intermediate products rather than the larger production function
linking budget inputs with social welfare outputs. In this Part,
we identify the specific drivers of the larger production function,
setting out four broad categories of factors that might explain
Terry Anderson’s graph showing no apparent relationship between overall EPA funding and improvements in air quality: (1)
funding processes; (2) the diverse ecosystem of institutions and
their intermediate products; (3) the internal dynamics of the production function; and (4) external forces potentially disrupting
the production function.
A. ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS AND FUNDING
EPA is surely in the business of environmental protection.
That said, while environmental quality is a key goal of EPA, it
may not be its only goal, and sometimes not even its most important goal. Given its multiple principals and audiences, the
agency has other concerns as well. 71
To begin with, EPA’s budget may not be primarily directed
71. See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 315–17 (1989) (discussing how government agencies often focus efforts on those activities that can be
observed and counted).
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at environmental quality. Unlike a business, an agency’s spending discretion is limited and the result of an explicitly political,
rather than technical, process. Every February, the President
submits a budget to Congress reflecting the negotiations between the different agencies and the White House. The Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) is the key player in these discussions.72 The submitted budget is subjected to committee hearings and adjusted by Congress, with members influencing the
budget to reflect their particular concerns (which may or may
not focus on maximizing environmental quality). 73 Taken together, the final budget can differ considerably from what the
agency first proposed. In 2016, for example, the President’s
budget proposal for EPA requested $8.6 billion 74 and Congress
appropriated $8.1 billion. 75 Just over forty percent of this
amount was for State and Tribal Assistance Grants that pass
through directly to the recipients.76 EPA has no authority to
spend this money. 77 When those funds were combined with
funds dedicated to cleaning up contaminated sites, about fiftysix percent of EPA’s proposed budget was locked up.78 Even the
agency’s remaining funds are somewhat constrained because of
statutory requirements and court-ordered consent decrees. 79
72. Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy
Control, 125 YALE L.J. 2182, 2207–08 (2015).
73. See generally Joseph C. Stanko, Jr., EPA’s Budget: How Low Will It Go?,
HUNTON & WILLIAMS: THE NICKEL REPORT (June 20, 2017), http://www
.huntonnickelreportblog.com/2017/06/epas-budget-how-low-will-it-go (discussing the proposed reduction to EPA’s budget and the reduction’s effect on the
EPA’s operations).
74. See EPA, FY 2016: EPA BUDGET IN BRIEF 3 (2015), http://www.epa.gov/
sites/production/files/2015-02/documents/fy_2016_bib_ combined_v5.pdf.
75. See EPA’s Budget and Spending, supra note 8.
76. The total allocated for State and Tribal Assistance Grants under the
2016 EPA budget was $3.5 billion, or approximately 43.8% of the total budget.
EPA, FY 2017: EPA BUDGET IN BRIEF 85 (2016) [hereinafter 2017 EPA
BUDGET], http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-02/documents/fy17
-budget-in-brief.pdf.
77. See Multipurpose Grants to States and Tribes, EPA, http://www.epa
.gov/grants/multipurpose-grants-states-and-tribes (last visited Nov. 4, 2017)
(discussing the use of these funds to support “state-defined high priority activities”).
78. The 2016 Superfund Cleanup budget was $1.1 billion. 2017 EPA
BUDGET, supra note 76, at 83. Thus, the total dedicated in 2016 to State and
Tribal Assistance Grants and Superfund cleanup was $4.6 billion, or 56.8% of
the total 2016 EPA budget.
79. See, e.g., Larry Bell, EPA’s Secret and Costly ‘Sue and Settle’ Collusion
with Environmental Organizations, FORBES (Feb. 17, 2013), http://www.forbes
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Given that the budget results from politics rather than a focus
on the environmental bottom line, one would not expect a tight
correlation.
Moreover, much attention—in Congress, in the media, and
by researchers—is paid to EPA’s compliance and enforcement efforts. Compliance and enforcement tend to be easily quantifiable: how many enforcement actions are taken, and how large are
the fines? Enforcement actions against large companies, and the
imposition of large fines, have tended to draw considerable media coverage. 80 It would hardly be unreasonable for EPA to
choose to divert resources to measures that it feels the media
carefully follows even if they are indirectly related to environmental quality. Equally, one might expect an agency with little
oversight to feel free to pursue long-term, as opposed to shortterm, goals—likely those that are less quantifiable and less readily subject to measurement.
Since there will always be more than one goal for the agency
to pursue, it will also need to allocate resources among its goals.
The emergence of a new policy concern might cause an agency to
spread its resources around. For example, the issue of climate
change and greenhouse gases has loomed larger and larger over
the last decade, requiring more agency resources. Nor is there a
single measure of air quality. EPA might choose to pursue environmental quality by seeking to meet all uniform nationwide
standards (as the Clean Air Act does through its creation of national ambient air quality standards), by focusing on improving
environmental quality in areas where it is especially poor, or by
prioritizing some pollutants over others.81 Moreover, the silo approach of the agency’s organization—under which personnel and
.com/sites/larrybell/2013/02/17/epas-secret-and-costly-sue-and-settle-collusion
-with-environmental-organizations/#44f50b8ef4e5 (“[T]he U.S. Chamber of
Commerce discovered many new rulemakings and unreasonable permitting delays which appeared to have resulted from such consent decrees in which the
EPA agreed to bind itself to issue new regulations on a specific timetable . . . .”).
80. See, e.g., Chris Isidore, Fiat Chrysler Cheated on Diesel Emissions, EPA
Says, CNN (Jan. 13, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/12/news/companies/
epa-emissions-cheating-fiat-chrysler/index.html?iid=ob_homepage_
deskrecommended_pool (discussing how multiple carmakers have been caught
cheating on emissions tests).
81. Cf. James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, The Magnitude and Policy Implications of Health Risks from Hazardous Waste Sites, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND 55, 76–80 (Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995) (criticizing
risk assessment under CERCLA statute as sometimes too stringent, in part as
a response to public perceptions of risks of hazardous waste sites); Jonathan
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management responsibilities are divided according to separate
media (air, water, solid waste) 82—means that there will be internal office decisions as to which goals to prioritize, and those decisions may not align with overall improvements in environmental quality.
B. INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR INTERMEDIATE PRODUCTS
As the diagram in Part II showed, a range of institutions
contribute to improving environmental quality—such as the
EPA, state and local government, industry, and NGOs. In some
cases these institutions have interconnecting relationships with
EPA—such as when EPA delegates pollution permitting authority to a state and then oversees how that state administers the
program to regulate private entities. 83 But all environmental
quality production need not necessarily begin with, go through,
or even touch EPA. State and local agencies have budgets and
authorities that may be outside the scope of EPA’s domain, 84 and
private institutions can engage in their own forms of environmental policy, independent of any EPA mandates.85
Importantly, in all of these instances (except direct industry
emissions) these institutional players are producing intermediate products in the form of policy instruments. In other words,
EPA uses its budget to produce regulations, monitor, sanction,
educate, conduct research, and so on. The same is true for state
and local regulators. Industry groups develop codes of practice,
and businesses and NGOs file citizen suits, lobby agency and
elected officials, and mobilize at the grassroots. None of these
activities directly produces improvements or harms to environ-

Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography: Designing Marketable Permit Schemes To Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q.
569, 578–79 (2001) (explaining how the shape of the damage function for a pollutant determines whether the pollutant is better uniformly distributed or concentrated a few points).
82. See EPA Organization Chart, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/
epa-organization-chart (last updated Mar. 14, 2017).
83. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 71.10 (2017) (authorizing the EPA to delegate authority to administer air quality operating permits to state, local, or tribal agencies).
84. Clifford Rechtschaffen & David L. Markell, Improving State Environmental Enforcement Performance Through Enhanced Government Accountability and Other Strategies, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10559, 10577 (2003).
85. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 162–63 (2013).

724

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:695

mental quality. These are all outputs of each institution’s particular production function that then, as intermediate products, go
into the larger environmental quality production function.
These intermediate products, though, are much easier to
measure and link directly to resource levels, which explains
why most studies of how we produce environmental protection
have focused on evaluating the role of intermediate products
such as enforcement actions.86 Less attention is paid to their role
in the larger production of environmental quality—that is, which
intermediate goods are most influential in the production function—which will likely change depending on the measure of environmental quality and over time. One could hold constant or
increase funding of the agency, for example, but not contribute
to environmental quality because the agency is producing the
wrong intermediate products. Some of the most important of
these intermediate products are briefly described below.
1. Regulations
Some of Terry Anderson’s chart can be explained by regulatory history—the production of highly effective intermediate
products in the form of regulatory standards. Referring back to
Chart 2, one can spot large drops in pollution soon after major
regulatory enactments. Lead levels dropped dramatically after
EPA adopted regulations in the early 1970s 87 and NOx fell after
regulations the EPA adopted pursuant to the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments. 88
It should not be surprising that promulgation of strict regulations leads to pollution reductions. As a consequence, resources
spent on regulatory drafting and implementation will likely have
greater impacts on environmental quality than other agency expenditures, such as on public education. And these can be relatively inexpensive activities. Moreover, when money is spent developing a regulation and when it is implemented may differ
considerably, confounding efforts to link agency spending on environmental quality.
86. See, e.g., Mintz, supra note 11, at 10511 (discussing a reduced number
of facility inspections and civil actions as evidence of a less effective EPA).
87. See Joseph L. Annest et al., Chronological Trend in Blood Lead Levels
Between 1976 and 1980, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1373, 1373, 1375–76 (1983).
88. See, e.g., Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) Control Regulations, EPA, http://www
.epa.gov/region1/airquality/nox.html (last updated Sept. 1, 2017) (noting a fall
in NOx emissions from utilities and large stationary sources between 1990 and
1996).
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Nevertheless, focusing on agency budgets may also largely
miss the point. As a regulatory agency, EPA’s costs are a relatively minor factor in the overall production function of environmental quality. The main costs for reducing pollution fall on the
regulated community. 89 Thus, one reaction to budget cuts might
be that the agency shields its regulation-producing offices, protecting its most effective units (similar to how the body shunts
blood to the brain when starved of oxygen). 90
2. Monitoring and Enforcement

The conventional wisdom is that less agency enforcement
will result in worse outcomes in the relevant policy area. As Gary
Becker’s classic formulation asserted, rational actors will adjust
their noncompliant behavior based on the likelihood of detection
and the magnitude of sanction.91 This partly explains the results
of the Flatt and Collins research: when state agencies spend less
on enforcement, plants spend more time in noncompliance.
There is an equally strong body of literature, however, suggesting that much environmental noncompliance is not the result of bad faith but rather lack of capacity. 92 Most regulated
parties, this literature suggests, would comply if they knew
how. 93 The problem is not inadequate monitoring and sanctions
89. Interestingly, measured in terms of the number of rules published in
the Federal Register, there has been little or no correlation between regulation
and budget. According to the Americans for Competitive Enterprise, a deregulatory think tank, apart from the drop in 2012–2013 that the authors attribute
to a decrease in regulatory activity in the run-up to the 2012 election, EPA regulations did not noticeably decline from 2002–2013. Clyde Wayne Crews, Red
Tapeworm 2014: Are Environmental Protection Agency Regulations Declining?
Don’t Bet on It, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. (Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.cei.org/
blog/red-tapeworm-2014-are-environmental-protection-agency-regulations
-declining-dont-bet-it.
90. Former EPA Deputy Administrator Robert Perciasepe has described
the agency’s budget strategy in terms of saving jobs. Perciasepe, supra note 10
(“For many years, a budget priority for EPA was to preserve the work force.
That came to an end in the first term of Obama as the budget kept getting
squeezed both [in funding] and by inflation. A ‘preserve the workforce’ policy
was eroding research, extramural assistance (contractors) and basic employee
support like training and new computer equipment. EPA let the FTE level float
down to 15,000 from about 18,000 by attrition and buyouts.”).
91. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169, 207 (1968).
92. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem
of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 794–96
(2003).
93. Id. (“For us the important message is that the regulatory community—
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but lack of resources to navigate complex regulatory regimes. 94
Put another way, it is possible that reducing enforcement
expenditures would have little impact on environmental quality
because most parties would still comply. This is an empirical
question and has important implications for EPA’s enforcement
strategies. If true, it suggests that EPA could shift its enforcement emphasis from specific deterrence (changing the behavior
of the individual charged) to general deterrence (a smaller number of enforcement actions intended to influence the larger regulated community).
3. The Importance of State and Local Protection Efforts
The intermediate products of state and local agencies also
include regulations, inspections, and enforcement. If you compare the number of environmental agency personnel at the federal and state levels, state officials far outnumber those at
EPA.95 Indeed, through its cooperative federalism model, the
EPA has delegated the implementation and enforcement of most
of its significant environmental laws to states, writing the regulations for states to enforce while retaining an oversight and
strategic role. 96 As a result, one would expect that the EPA’s
budget would be less important for environmental quality than
are state budgets. A key question, therefore, is whether there is
a correlation between state agency budgets and environmental
quality. The Flatt and Collins study suggests this may be the
both regulators and the regulated alike—strongly perceives the sheer number
of rules as an impediment to compliance.”).
94. Id.
95. EPA had 15,376 full-time equivalents in FY 2016. See EPA, supra note
76, at 11. California has over 4000; New York over 3000; Texas about 2800;
Florida about 3100. CalEPA Employment Information, CAL. EPA, http://calepa
.ca.gov/Employment (last visited Nov. 4, 2017); Employment, N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/about/jobs.html (last visited Nov. 4,
2017); About the TCEQ, TEX. COMM’N ENVTL. QUALITY, http://www.tceq
.texas.gov/about (last visited Nov. 4, 2017); Administration, FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., http://www.dep.state.fl.us/secretary/stats/administration.htm (last
visited Nov. 4, 2017).
96. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012) (assigning to states the responsibility
to create Clean Air Act state implementation plans, subject to EPA approval);
33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2012) (allowing EPA to delegate some NPDES permitting
to states); SARAH GRACE LONGSWORTH ET AL., ENVTL. COUNCIL OF STATES,
STATE DELEGATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL ACTS (2016), https://www.ecos.org/
documents/state-delegations (“Many federal environmental statutes were designed by the U.S. Congress to allow states to assume partial or full control of
the resulting programs through the delegation process.”).
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case, but more direct research is needed (we provide an example
below in Part IV). A potential problem with this explanation is
that many state environmental agency budgets have also been
cut over time, some dramatically so. 97
4. Industry Codes of Conduct

Linked to the explanation of market forces described above,
private standards may serve the purpose of regulation and obviate the need for EPA resources. For example, Michael Vandenbergh has provided many examples of private certification systems effectively acting as regulations through supply chains and
being enforced by large retailers such as Walmart and Home Depot. 98 The key question, of course, is to what extent such private
standards actually influence environmental quality.
5. Nongovernmental Actors’ Use of Citizen Suits
One of the defining features of environmental law is the ability of nonstate actors under many statutes to step into the shoes
of public prosecutor and litigate against agencies when they are
not carrying out mandatory duties or against any entity, including the agency, alleged to be violating the statute. 99 These socalled citizen suits can be path breaking and certainly offer one
likely explanation for why environmental quality might not decline, or could even increase, during times of agency austerity.
Indeed, the number of citizen suits clearly increased during the
Reagan Administration, when EPA enforcement efforts were reduced.100 As a result, even when agency resources dwindle or
97. Eighteen states decreased the budget of their environmental agencies
between 2011 and 2015. See Linda K. Breggin, Are State Agency Budgets Rising
Enough To Meet New Challenges?, ENVTL. F., Sept.–Oct. 2016, at 11.
98. Vandenbergh, supra note 85, at 197 (discussing Walmart’s commitment
to reduce its supply-chain emissions); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Keynote Address at Pace Environmental Law Review Symposium: Reconceptualizing the
Future of Environmental Law (Mar. 20, 2015) (transcript on file with Pace
Law School), http://www.law.pace.edu/symposium-reconceptualizing-future
-environmental-law; Performance, HOME DEPOT, https://corporate.homedepot
.com/responsibility/performance (last visited Nov. 4, 2017) (describing Home
Depot’s progress in reducing emissions and using less energy).
99. See Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and
Environmental Protection, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 39, 46 (2001) (describing the standard citizen-suit provisions that appear in most of the major environmental statutes).
100. See Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law,
65 TUL. L. REV. 339, 352, 360 n.94 (1990) (discussing an increase in citizen suits
during the mid-1980s).
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there is little political will for strong enforcement, there exists a
potent backup. Organized interest groups can take on enforcement efforts at times of agency austerity.
C. INTERNAL DYNAMICS
In addition to the range of intermediate products produced
by EPA and other actors, one must also consider their relative
importance. A thoughtful decision-maker needs to choose not
only which intermediate products to produce but how much of
each. This decision requires consideration of marginal returns,
substitutability, path dependence, and innovation.
1. Marginal Returns

Following neoclassical economic theory, adding marginal increments of an input over time eventually leads to diminishing
marginal returns of the final product. 101 Applying this principle
to the environmental quality production function, each production input that influences environmental quality, from raw inputs like funding to intermediate product inputs like regulations, likely does so in a nonlinear relationship with diminishing
marginal returns.
For example, let’s say EPA initiates a new widget facility
inspection program. In year one, it inspects 100 facilities and detects 200 violations, which when corrected reduces emissions by
quantity X. Each year it adds 100 facilities into the program until, after five years, all 500 widget facilities are being inspected
every year. It is highly unlikely that the program will produce
5(X) emissions reductions year after year. Each time a facility is
first inspected, the most egregious violations are detected—the
program catches the low hanging fruit. Over time, most violations the program detects will be minor except for possible bad
actor violations. As a result, the program cannot possibly expect
to return the same annual emissions reductions over time.
A particular policy instrument may also have diminishing
marginal returns because of physical properties of technology
and the environment. It may simply not be possible to produce a
widget without some level of particulate emissions. Once regulation or other measures have squeezed the widget industry down

101. Law of Diminishing Returns, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (2d ed.
2002).
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to that level, only reductions in total widget production or a technological breakthrough will produce lower total emissions. This
is why many pollution regulation programs take technology into
account. 102
Diminishing marginal returns can explain why EPA funding changes may have little impact on air quality measures.
EPA’s mix of intermediate products devoted to reducing particulate emissions, for example, could reach a phase of diminished
marginal returns where the low-hanging fruit have all been
picked. This works in both directions, however: if EPA has
reached the point that adding another dollar to produce an intermediate product yields little or no incremental addition in aggregate benefit, then taking away a dollar will likewise yield little or no incremental reduction in aggregate benefit.
Keep in mind, however, that while decreasing budgets for
intermediate products may initially, and perhaps for a good
while, produce little incremental change in emissions, eventually the reductions in budget, because of the nonlinear property
of the budget-outcome dynamic, would move back into a phase of
increasing marginal effects. At some point, therefore, major cuts
in EPA funding should result in significant reductions in environmental quality. This raises issues of resiliency, which we address in Part V.
2. Input Substitutability
Given the large universe of institutions and instruments at
work in the environmental quality production function, it is
highly likely that (1) not every input has the same marginal returns curve; and (2) some inputs can substitute for others and
improve production efficiency. To put it bluntly, if you had $100
million to spend on environmental quality improvement, would
you simply hand it all to EPA and say, here you go, run with it?
Certainly not. A prudent investor in environmental quality
would investigate which inputs get the most marginal bang for
the buck. Perhaps financing industry best-practice codes is more
effective on the margin in reducing emissions than adding to
EPA’s monitoring budget, or perhaps financing NGO citizen

102. See Thomas O. McGarity, Media-Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit
Balancing Strategies for Health and Environmental Regulation, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 198–99 (1983) (discussing how Congress has “acknowledged
economic concerns by adopting a technology-based approach”).
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suits is more effective than financing industry codes. If the intermediate products EPA is using have low marginal returns
and other institutions are using products with higher marginal
returns, the other institutions are necessarily going to have more
influence with the marginal dollar on the intended regulatory
benefits.
3. Path Dependence from Capital Investments

We have already noted the relationship between strict regulation and improvements in environmental quality. This relationship raises additional questions: Why do regulated parties
comply initially with the regulations, and then continue to improve performance over time? For many pollutants, capital investment locks in pollution gains. For those air pollutants that
are reduced by pollution control devices, once the control technologies have been installed they should keep pollutant levels
down so long as there is not a high cost of operation and maintenance. And even if there are high operating costs, companies
may still choose to keep the technologies in place. The implication is that once EPA sets the reductions in motion through regulation, the reductions become locked in place irrespective of
later reductions in EPA’s budget. While this could explain initial
drops in pollution, however, it does not explain why the concentrations of many pollutants continued to drop over time. That
may be due, at least in part, to different plants reaching full compliance at different times.
4. Innovation
Production function theory includes innovation as a powerful force in improving the ability of firms to produce products
more efficiently. Similarly, just as a new technology or new product can change the production function of a widget, the creation
of new institutions and instruments can strongly affect the regulatory production function. For example, the creation of EPA in
1970 changed the production function of environmental quality
by providing an institutional framework for the implementation
of the new environmental laws. 103 The lead phasedown and Toxic
Release Inventory programs were all new kinds of intermediate
103. But see Jonathan H. Adler, The Fable of Federal Environmental Regulation: Reconsidering the Federal Role in Environmental Protection, 55 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 93, 96 (2004) (pointing out that “by 1966, every state had adopted
water pollution legislation of some sort”).
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products that changed the production function. And some innovative market-based instruments, such as the SO2 cap-and-trade
program and wetlands mitigation banking, have greatly reduced
the costs of regulation.104 These are all examples of regulatory
innovation, not just iterations of traditional regulatory approaches, each having a profound effect on the efficiency of the
regulatory production function. 105
D. EXTERNAL FORCES
The last major driver of the production function for environmental quality is external to the system. These include most
prominently market forces, global and domestic politics, and natural stochastic events. While increasing agency spending might
improve environmental quality all else equal, all else will not be
equal. For example, spending money to expand the size of a police force might well reduce crime “all else equal,” but other extrinsic factors—such as the state of the economy, overcrowding
in prisons, and the weather—may have a larger combined marginal effect on crime.106 Depending on those other factors, it is
possible that an increase in funding might be seen to accompany
a decrease in goal quality. In other words, external forces could
overwhelm actions by EPA, indeed by most of the relevant government actors, to influence environmental quality.
1. Market Effects
Market forces act on economic and regulatory production
functions at both the macro and micro levels. At the macro level,
economic growth has a major influence on levels of production of
goods and services and therefore levels of most pollutants. The
104. See Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, The SO2 Allowance
Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment, 27 J. ECON.
PERSP. 103, 106–09 (2013) (discussing the performance of the SO2 cap-and-trade
program); Shirley Jeanne Whitsitt, Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 3 ENVTL.
LAW. 441, 459–62 (1997) (describing the benefits of wetlands mitigation banking).
105. See David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, Dynamic Governance in
Theory and Application, Part I, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 629 (2016) (arguing that
policy design should account for potential innovation in regulatory approaches,
giving administrators management tools that are adaptive enough to enable
them to take advantage of potential developments and thus promote efficiency).
106. See Mitchell B. Chamlin & Beth A. Sanders, Reintroducing “ Time” into
the Time Series Analysis of the Police Size-Crime Relationship: An Error Correction Approach, 31 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATS. & MGMT. 499, 509 (2008)
(discussing the challenge of controlling for the effect of extrinsic factors).
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recent history of China provides clear evidence of that; as is also
true in the United States. 107 Recessions tend to reduce pollution
while boom periods lead to greatly increased levels of potentially
polluting activities.108 We address this dynamic in our regressions reported in Part IV by controlling for sovereign gross product.
At the micro level, every pollutant tells its own story. In particular, parties may have economic incentives to reduce pollution
wholly apart from regulatory compliance. It may just be good
business.
Some of the reductions in particulate matter, for example,
can be explained by commodity prices. In particular, fracking
has dramatically changed energy markets in recent years. 109
Natural gas, a cleaner fuel than coal, has dropped in price.110 As
a result, there has been a large-scale shift as coal-fired utilities
reduce their coal use and build natural-gas-fired units. The overall effect is a drop in particulate matter from electricity generating units. 111
2. Politics
Like market forces, significant changes in political landscapes also can substantially alter the regulatory production
function at macro and micro scales. As of this writing, for example, President Trump has set in motion sea changes in energy
107. See, e.g., Jason J. Czarnezki, Climate Policy & U.S.-China Relations, 12
VT. J. ENVTL. L. 659, 661 (2011) (linking the fact that the U.S. and China are
the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitters to the economies of those countries).
108. See Garth Heutel & Christopher J. Ruhm, Air Pollution and Procyclical
Mortality, 3 J. ASS’N ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECONOMISTS 667, 683 (2016).
109. See, e.g., Christina Nunez, How Has Fracking Changed Our Future?,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Nov. 11, 2013), http://environment.nationalgeographic
.com/environment/energy/great-energy-challenge/big-energy-question/how-has
-fracking-changed-our-future.
110. See, e.g., Marianne Lavelle, Natural Gas Nation: EIA Sees U.S. Future
Shaped by Fracking, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Dec. 7, 2012), https://news
.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/12/121207-annual-energy-outlook
-2013.
111. While market forces are clearly part of the story, this cannot be the sole
explanation for three reasons. First, particulate matter concentrations were
falling before the advent of fracking. Second, other conventional air pollutants
also have fallen over time so, at a minimum, researchers would need to understand the role of market forces in their respective stories. And finally, another
market reason for fuel switching from coal to natural gas has been the added
costs of regulatory compliance from recent Clean Air Act regulations aimed at
coal-burning pollution. Regulation is also part of the explanation.
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policy, environmental policy, and other regulatory domains. 112
Although the basic diagram of the air quality production function depicted above in Chart 1 is likely to remain representative—despite campaign rhetoric, EPA does not appear to be a
target for complete elimination—the relationships between the
actors and sectors, as well as the internal cultures of each actor,
are likely to be transformed to some nontrivial degree. At a
macro scale, one could reasonably surmise that new federal policies promoting energy development, infrastructure, and economic interests in general will ascend in priority. This broad policy trend in turn would likely redirect EPA’s agenda, increase
environmental NGO activity, and leave more work to the state
environmental agencies in states pursuing more active environmental policies. President Trump has made clear, for example,
that EPA will not continue down the road of climate-change regulation the agency pursued under the Obama Administration. 113
Environmental NGOs are likely to step up activities to resist
that policy shift, such as litigating to challenge agency repeal of
regulations, and some state and local agencies will move to fill
the gaps created by the new federal agenda. The upshot is that
the marginal impact on environmental quality of funding the
next dollar to EPA, an NGO, or a state agency is likely to be altered as a result of this massive political upheaval.
Political effects also are not limited to major events bearing
so directly on the regulatory production function and may come
from seemingly distant sources. For example, OPEC’s decisions
regarding oil production have profound impacts on the U.S. domestic economy,114 which as discussed above can influence the
effectiveness of additional investment in regulation.115 Similarly, decisions made by India and China regarding the development and burning of fossil fuels necessarily influence the effectiveness of U.S. domestic policies regarding carbon emissions. 116
112. See, e.g., A Running List of How Trump Is Changing the Environment,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/03/how-trump-is
-changing-science-environment (last updated Oct. 25, 2017).
113. See Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,094 (Mar. 31, 2017)
(rescinding Obama administration executive orders on climate change policy).
114. See, e.g., Don Briggs, How Does OPEC Affect US Oil Prices?, USA TODAY (Oct. 4, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/10/04/
opec-affect-us-oil-prices/73346054.
115. See supra notes 107–08.
116. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007) (noting,
though rejecting, the argument that EPA ought not regulate greenhouse gas
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3. Natural Stochastic Events
Parents forever debate the relative contributions of nature
and nurture, and environmental protection is no different. While
anthropogenic emissions and waste clearly affect environmental
quality, so, too, does natural variation. Particularly wet seasons
will reduce concentrations of water pollutants, while droughts
will increase them. Wind patterns can disperse concentrations of
air pollutants. Periods of clear skies and still air will lead to
greater production of smog than windy and overcast periods.
Thus, our contributions to environmental quality will always be
in combination with the changing environmental conditions
themselves.
*****
To summarize, in Part III we have provided a more complete
(and more complicated) picture of the production function
sketched in Part II. A few key insights emerge:
(1) Numerous institutions are involved in the production
of environmental quality, but not all of these institutions
necessarily view environmental quality as their most important product;
(2) Regulatory agencies use funding to produce and use
intermediate instrument products such as regulations,
standards, litigation, and monitoring that impact environmental quality;
(3) The influence each input and intermediate product
has on the production function depends on internal functional dynamics such as its marginal effects, substitutability, capital investments, and innovative effect; and
(4) The overall production function will be affected by external forces such as stochastic natural, market, and political events.
Importantly, these insights are equally applicable to other regulatory agencies, whether their charge be human health or market stability
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: HOW MUCH DO
REGULATORY AGENCY BUDGETS MATTER?
We have used Terry Anderson’s chart overlaying EPA’s
budget and air quality levels to address the question politicians
and interest groups have put in play—how much do regulatory
agency budgets matter?—and to develop the production function
emissions voluntarily, lest the United States lose leverage to negotiate with developing countries).
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model as a way of framing the theoretical dimension of the question. But what about the empirical question: is there evidence
that spending by environmental agencies has a positive effect on
environmental quality? The preceding Parts explained why even
an environmental agency that sought to improve environmental
quality might face severe difficulties in being able directly to attain that goal. These same difficulties—the existence of actors
other than EPA in determining environmental quality; the role
of, and interplay among, intermediate products in determining
final environmental quality; and the unpredictable nature of external forces as intervening factors in the causal chain—also
make it challenging to measure empirically whether government
spending has an effect on environmental quality. There also is
the question of exactly what measure of environmental quality
to use.117
With that caveat, we nevertheless endeavor to examine empirically Anderson’s focus on the effect (if any) of environmental
agency spending on ambient air pollution levels for criteria pollutants.118 Anderson’s chart suggests no such relationship. The
competing theory—the notion that an agency will do less with
less (and thus more with more) suggests, to the contrary, that an
increase in agency spending should lead to a decrease in ambient
pollution levels.
Along these lines, we consider two primary hypotheses that
posit how environmental agency funding affects environmental
quality. The first, Hypothesis A, corresponds to the more with
more thesis.
Hypothesis A: An increase in environmental agency funding
results in an increase in environmental quality.
In contrast to Hypothesis A stands the Null Hypothesis, which
117. See HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 36, at 212–15 (noting the difficulty in identifying the proper measure for water quality). Compare William E.
Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good Performance?,
16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 903 (2009) (proposing metrics by which to measure output of competition agencies), with Edward Iacobucci & Michael Trebilcock,
Evaluating the Performance of Competition Agencies: The Limits of Assessment
Methodologies and Their Policy Implications (Sept. 21, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author) (arguing that it is largely fruitless to try develop measures to compare performance across national competition agencies).
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2012) (directing the EPA Administrator to develop national ambient air quality standards for criteria pollutants).
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here corresponds to the more with less thesis.
Null Hypothesis: An increase in environmental agency
funding results in no change in environmental quality.
The possibility that there is a lag between funding and expenditures on the one hand, and changes in environmental quality on
the other, poses a significant challenge. Ideally, we would have
run our regressions using time-lagged variables, but the paucity
of the available data made that impractical. Instead, two features of our analysis help mitigate the time-lag problem. First,
as our dependent variable, we focus on annual changes in 2.5micrometer particulate matter levels. 119 Since particulate matter is heavier than other pollutants, it remains suspended in the
air for a shorter time. That, in turn, shortens the time horizon
across which changes in environmental agency funding affects
(if indeed it does affect) pollutant concentrations. Second, most
states’ fiscal years—and the fiscal years for all the states in our
study—end on June 30, 120 while pollutant data are based on the
calendar year. There is, in other words, a built-in six-month lag.
Our focus on annual changes in 2.5-micrometer particulate
matter levels as our dependent variable offers other benefits as
well. For one thing, data on criteria pollutants—including particulate matter—are readily available for a large number of air
quality monitoring stations nationwide and over an extended period of years. 121 In addition, the fact that particulate matter is a
heavier pollutant, and remains suspended in the air a shorter
time, means that it travels a shorter distance from its source
than do lighter pollutants. This should minimize the challenge
of accounting for enforcement efforts in distant jurisdictions
(which would be very relevant for pollutants that travel greater
distances).122
119. We took annual averages of the “annual 2013” measure of 2.5-micrometer particulate matter (PM2.5) levels at all receptor points for each state in the
study in EPA’s database.
120. See Quick Reference Fiscal Table, NAT’L CONFERENCE STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/basic-information-about
-which-states-have-major-ta.aspx#fyrs (last updated July 13, 2012) (noting that
all states but Alabama, Michigan, New York and Texas end their fiscal years on
June 30).
121. See Pre-Generated Data Files, EPA, http://aqsdr1.epa.gov/aqsweb/
aqstmp/airdata/download_files.html (last updated May 26, 2017).
122. See Nash & Revesz, supra note 81, at 576–78 (distinguishing among
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Our independent variable is the annual change in environmental agency funding devoted to air pollution (converted to
2013 dollars). 123 We initially sought to perform our analysis on
the funding of EPA itself. However, we found insufficient data
going back in time to allow us to assemble a dataset with enough
data points to perform meaningful statistical analysis (we discuss later the implications of this result for data compilation policy). 124 That said, though we do not report the results, we ran
statistical tests on the limited EPA data we could assemble. 125
Similar to the statistical tests on the state-level data we describe
below, we found no statistically significant relationship between
changes in funding levels and changes in pollution levels.126
Instead, we performed our analysis using state environmental agency funding levels, for which more robust data are available. Given the substantial funding levels state environmental
protection agencies receive from the EPA, as well as their sharing an overall structure and mission similar to the EPA’s, state
agencies can act as a close substitute for the EPA in this regard.
We analyze data from six states: Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, New
Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. These states include areas that
have been identified as suffering from the worst 2.5-micrometer
particulate matter pollution in the nation.127 Because the cost of
environmental compliance can sometimes vary unpredictably
and unforeseeably 128—which may tend to mask the extent to
global, regional, and local pollutants).
123. Our choice to rely on higher-level, broader measures of environmental
agency funding is a deliberate one. While program-specific funding is more
likely to address directly the environmental quality issue on which we are focusing, it is also less likely to remain a consistently reported budget item over
time, therefore making time series data sets difficult to compile. Broader agency
funding figures will relate less directly to the particular problem but are more
amenable to comparisons across periods of time.
124. See infra note 132.
125. We did not report the results because the limited number of data points
render the findings insufficiently reliable.
126. See infra note 131 (noting the nature of the results of the statistical
runs on EPA data).
127. See AM. LUNG ASS’N, STATE OF THE AIR 15 (2015) (listing areas subject
to the greatest PM2.5 pollution). We selected a subset of states that included
heavily polluted areas for which we had reliable budget data.
128. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between
Tradable Pollution Allowances and the “Polluter Pays” Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 492 (2000) (explaining that market prices for tradable sulfur
dioxide emissions allowances in the 1990s may have actually decreased as a
result of “shift to coal . . . which has a lower sulfur content”).
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which enforcement spending spurs environmental quality—we
also control for annual state gross product (converted to 2013
dollars).
Our analysis examines annual changes in the relevant variables, beginning with the change from 2004 to 2005, and proceeding to the change from 2012 to 2013. Thus, the study lies
sufficiently after, and allows for state agency budgets to have
had time to reflect, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (the
last major air pollution statute). This also avoids the concern of
accounting for initial reductions in pollution emissions that were
relatively inexpensive to effect, and thus (under a rational actor
model of deterrence), would have required relatively little threat
of enforcement to induce compliance.
We ran an ordinary least-square regression, including year
and state fixed effects, with robust standard errors. The results
appear in Table 1. They reveal no statistically significant relationship between changes in agency funding levels and changes
in particulate matter concentrations. And, though we do not report them here, the results also revealed no significant relationship for similar regressions for (1) other criteria pollutant concentrations 129 against state environmental-agency air-pollution
funding levels; 130 and also (2) 2.5-micrometer particulate matter
concentrations against measures of EPA funding. 131 In the end,
129. We did not run a regression with lead concentrations as the dependent
variable since some states lacked receptor points during some of the time period
under study.
130. We ran regressions (otherwise identical to the regression reported in
the text) with independent variable being the change in concentration in PM10,
carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, ozone, and sulfur dioxide. In only one regression did the coefficient for the change in pollutant concentration even approach significance at the 10% level—the regression for ozone concentrations
(p = 0.102).
131. We ran two regressions. In both, the dependent variable was the change
in national PM2.5 concentrations. We controlled in both regressions for the
change in the national gross domestic product. Also, insofar as combustion of
natural gas contributes to particulate matter pollution, we included the annual
change in the national average citygate price for 1000 cubic feet of natural gas.
Natural Gas Prices, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 31, 2017), http://www
.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_pri_sum_a_epg0_pg1_dmcf_m.htm.
The first regression had the change in EPA support for air quality management over the time period 2005–2006 to 2013–2014 as the key independent variable. The federal support for air quality management program includes both
EPA headquarters and regional federal support to state, tribal, and local air
pollution control agencies for the implementation of evaluation of programs related to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). The program
also includes regular review of any associated national guidance and outreach
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we find no support for Hypothesis A. And, while absence of evidence of a relationship does not mean that there is no such relationship,132 our empirical analysis confirms the implications of
Terry Anderson’s chart that there is not a clear relationship between agency funding and air pollutant concentrations.

information for implementation of standards. See Catalog of Environmental
Programs, EPA, http://archive.epa.gov/oig/catalog/web/html/44.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2017).
The second regression had as the key independent variable the change in
EPA sub-budget (which represents EPA’s entire budget, before rescission of
prior years’ funds and pension and benefits accrual) over the time period 2000–
2001 to 2013–2014.
While change in GDP was a statistically significant predictor of change in
pollutant concentrations in both regressions, in neither regression was the
change in EPA funding (or the price of natural gas) a statistically significant
variable. We decline to report the results owing to the paucity of data points
(N = 9 for the first regression, and N = 14 for the second).
132. In the language of statistics, we lack sufficient observations to validate
a power analysis. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Conflating Politics and Development? Examining Investment Treaty Arbitration Outcomes, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 13,
41 & n.120 (2014).
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Table 1: Results of regression of change in
PM2.5 concentration
(2004–05 to 2012–13)
Coefficient

Standard
Error

p-Value

-0.066

0.099

0.509

-1.884

0.849

0.032**

2005–2006

-0.294

0.040

0.000***

2006–2007

-0.011

0.052

0.835

Variable
Change in state environmental agency air pollution
budget
Change in gross product

2007–2008

-0.285

0.039

0.000***

2008–2009

-0.285

0.048

0.000***

2009–2010

-0.078

0.044

0.082*

2010–2011

-0.186

0.041

0.000***

2011–2012

-0.167

0.041

0.000***

2012–2013

-0.151

0.033

0.000***

Indiana

-0.076

0.052

0.153

Maryland

-0.092

0.050

0.071*

New Jersey

-0.093

0.053

0.090*

Ohio

-0.089

0.049

0.075*

Pennsylvania

-0.081

0.056

0.100

(Intercept)
-0.069
0.057
0.000***
2
N = 54; R = 0.725. *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the
5% level; * = significant at the 10% level.

We wish to make clear that our finding of no correlation advances the ball very little in the quest for greater understanding
of the budget-outcomes relationship. That we found no correlation does not mean there is none. And that is precisely the point
of our project: we used the best data available on the topic, applied state of the art regression analysis methods to them, and
produced a rudimentary result.
This suggests three important implications: (1) the focus in
the regulatory state on cost-benefit analysis of intermediate
products does not stimulate production of the right kind of data
for assessing the regulatory production function; (2) our time period tracked marginal budget changes, but correlations between
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funding and pollutant levels may only appear after more significant reductions; and (3) regression analysis may not be the exclusive tool needed to address the problem. In sum, the production function model of the regulatory agency budget-outcomes
relationship calls for generating new kinds of data, anticipating
a broader set of influential causal factors, and applying new
kinds of analytical tools. We turn to this challenge in Part V.
V. FOUNDATIONS FOR RESEARCH
We opened this paper by contrasting the conventional wisdom that reduced EPA funding will impair environmental quality with Terry Anderson’s chart purporting to refute that relationship. Neither view, however, relies on more than a
superficial black-box model of how EPA’s budget produces environmental quality. As Part I showed, scholars from relevant disciplines have not provided a more robust theoretical or empirical
explanation of the relationship between agency budget and outcomes. In Part II, we explained why a production function model
would be useful in understanding this relationship, and in Part
III we set out a more detailed picture of the different drivers operating within the production function, explaining why environmental quality might show no correlation to agency resources
when in fact a relationship could exist. To dig deeper, Part IV
then ran a series of regressions designed to test the correlation
between agency budget and measures of air quality, but found
no statistically significant correlation based on available data.
So, what have we learned? Alternative hypotheses continue
to be available for our findings. The fact that we find no correlation between EPA funding and air quality could be because EPA
is producing the wrong intermediate products, or not enough of
the important ones compared to the intermediate products other
institutions can produce (that is, the most important drivers during this time period may have been citizen suits or the low price
of natural gas). Or the opposite may be true—perhaps EPA is
producing the right intermediate products and doing so efficiently, such that budget austerity does not hinder the agency’s
production of environmental quality. There are three key points
to emphasize: (1)these alternatives suggest very different realities with completely different law and policy implications; (2)it
is not clear which is accurate; and (3) policy makers do not have
a robust methodology to figure this out.
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Why should we care about developing a more sophisticated
understanding of the relationship between agency funding and
outcomes? The obvious answer is that the competing black-box
models leave policy-makers deciding the appropriate size and allocation of agency budgets with no means to assess their decision
apart from the percent increase or decrease compared to previous budgets. This is as true for EPA as for other regulatory agencies. When presidential and congressional candidates call for
major budget cuts, as will likely happen in the next few years, 133
we need to better understand the likely consequences beyond reducing the deficit. It may be that the regulatory production function is simply too complicated to understand through quantitative analysis, but we will never know without serious research
that carefully determines the limits and potential of this new
analytical model.
Moreover, lack of understanding about the budget-outcome
relationship is not a problem only in times of austerity. Consider,
for example, how little basis there would be for knowing how to
expend an agency budget wisely and effectively in times of abundance. Whether cutting or expanding agency budgets, the analytical exercise is much the same.
As a thought experiment, if you were given control of an additional one billion dollars to spend on environmental protection
over the next five years and instructed to maximize the environmental quality improvement return on the dollar, where would
you invest? At a minimum, you would need to determine which
expenditures would provide the greatest marginal yield of environmental quality, and you would also need a means to assess
the effectiveness of your expenditures. These are the very same
challenges you would face if cutting the budget by one billion
dollars.
In this Part, we first identify the key questions that need to
be asked for both such challenges—good budget times and bad—
and then set out the most important analytical tasks needed for
providing the answers. Taken together, these lay the core foundation for both a research agenda and strategy directed at understanding the relationship between agency budgets and outcomes. Greater knowledge of this relationship can guide
133. See, e.g., Hope Yen, Trump’s Pick for Budget Director Has Urged Big
Spending Cuts, YAHOO! FIN. (Dec. 17, 2016), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/
trumps-pick-budget-director-urged-big-spending-cuts-191116373—finance
.html.
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questions and decisions regarding institutional design, policy instrument choice, federalism, and reliance on private governance.
While we use EPA as the illustrative case, our insights are
equally relevant for other regulatory agencies.
A. ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS
1. How should the budget be distributed among institutions?
Since EPA is not the only player in the environmental protection game and the government has a finite amount of money
dedicated to environmental protection, the threshold question is
how to distribute investments between federal programs, state
and local programs, environmental NGOs, private sector industry, and other actors. It may very well be the case that supporting compliance training in private-sector industrial facilities
would yield a greater return than investing the same amount in
EPA’s facility inspection program. 134 Investing in urban land
trusts to secure ecosystem services, such as water filtration and
groundwater recharge, could be more efficient at producing those
benefits than imposing tighter federal regulation of development
in wetlands. 135 Or perhaps the low-hanging fruit lies in state
programs facing even more austerity than EPA. Dollar for dollar,
beefing up state resources might make more of a difference to
environmental quality.
2. How should the budget be allocated within the agency so as
to pursue the optimal mix of intermediate products?
Once EPA’s budget is set, what should you instruct EPA to
do with the newfound money to maximize environmental quality? Would restoring programs that experienced the greatest
budget cuts in the past provide the best return on the dollar? Our
findings suggest not, at least for air quality—those cuts do not
appear to have prevented reductions in emissions. So, which intermediate products that EPA produces should receive the new
134. See Sarah L. Stafford, Private Policing of Environmental Performance:
Does It Further Public Goals?, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 73, 75 (2012) (noting
that “private organizations often have better access to certain information” and
“generally make decisions more quickly and with less red tape than public agencies”).
135. See, e.g., James Salzman, Lecture, What Is the Emperor Wearing? The
Secret Lives of Ecosystem Services, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 591, 593 (2011)
(pointing out how investments in “natural capital” can be more effective than
ones in “built capital”).
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money? Maybe it would be most effective for EPA to experiment
with producing new intermediate products. Again, there is virtually no quantitative empirical foundation on which to base
these decisions. 136
3. How should the budget be allocated to ensure resilience?

Resilience is a special kind of intermediate product meriting
its own consideration. We have little understanding of the extent
to which past decades of austerity may have deteriorated the resilience of EPA and other state and local agencies. It may be that
marginal budget changes initially have little effect on environmental protection because the system is resting in equilibrium.
If funding is reduced below a certain level, though, the equilibrium could shift into catastrophic failure through a combination
of loss of credibility, key personnel, or respect for the rule of law.
Many of the narratives about the drinking-water crisis in Flint,
Michigan, for example, have pointed the finger at underfunded
environmental agencies.137 This was, they charge, a tragedy
waiting to happen. 138 The large-scale governmental failure in
the Flint drinking-water crisis may be a one-off anomaly, or it
could be evidence of cracks building in the public governance infrastructure. 139 Are we close to a tipping point with EPA and
other federal and state public governance institutions? Does
Terry Anderson’s chart take a drastic turn for the worse or do
the lines keep diverging? Again, we do not know.
4. How should budget yield be measured?
The regulatory state, and environmental policy in particular, has relied heavily on the development of tools such as costbenefit analysis and risk assessment to evaluate the merits of
regulatory initiatives, such as a rule lowering particulate emis-

136. Comparatively speaking, air quality is one of the areas of environmental quality where the available data are comparatively good. Yet, as the analysis
in Part IV brings out, even their data are sparse and the prospects for valuable
empirical investigation are quite limited.
137. See, e.g., Lenny Bernstein & Brady Dennis, Flint’s Water Crisis Reveals
Government Failures at Every Level, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2016), http://wpo.st/
4A8Q2.
138. See, e.g., id.
139. See id.
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sions. Indeed, in some cases cost-benefit analysis can be the driving factor in determining the structure of a new regulation. 140
Neither of these tools, though, can usefully guide budget allocation decisions. That requires a marginal analysis between
dollars invested and environmental-quality results—calculating
the impact on environmental quality from an incremental investment in a particular institution’s budget. To understand the
marginal impact on environmental quality of raising or cutting
the EPA’s (or any other institution’s) budget, we need different
tools. Otherwise we are left trying to drive a nail with a spoon.
B. DESIGNING THE RESEARCH AGENDA
The difficulty of providing answers to the questions we have
just identified should suggest caution. The production function
of regulatory agencies is truly complex, with significant confounding factors. This explains in large part why our literature
search uncovered such scant scholarship on the topic. Nonetheless, the questions set out above are of the first importance for
law and policy. Seeking to answer them, even at a preliminary
level, will require an interdisciplinary research effort among
lawyers, economists, political scientists, and the environmental
science disciplines. Despite the difficulty, the research task is
well worth undertaking and long overdue.
The questions we asked in the previous section form, in essence, a sequential decision tree for determining budgets: (1) decide how monies should be distributed among agencies; (2) than
distributed within agencies; (3) how to ensure resilience; and (4)
how to measure the yield of budgeting decisions to assess
whether we received value for money. In most instances, we cannot currently answer these questions for any agency. To do so in
the future will require a focused research agenda. We set this
out in the following subsections, in the reverse order from that
set out in Part V.A. 141
140. See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 217–18
(2009) (upholding EPA’s use of cost-benefit analysis in determining Clean Water Act national performance standards).
141. We note that an initial question would typically call for the determination of what goal(s) an agency should pursue. Depending on the agency and
what the agency is charged to do, that question may be hard to answer. See
supra note 117 (citing to literature noting the difficulties in identifying such
goals for competition agencies). In the case of EPA and similar environmental
protection agencies, we think it clear that environmental quality in some form
is the ultimate goal, although we hasten to add that subsidiary issues remain,
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1. Developing Methods and Models to Assess Budget Yield
a. Marginal Returns Analysis Methods
As described above, cost-benefit analysis in the modern regulatory state is focused on the net social outcome of intermediate
products. Our concern, by contrast, focuses on how to allocate
institutional budget investments or cuts to most efficiently produce regulatory agency bang for the buck (whether environmental quality, health outcomes, or student learning—depending on
the agency’s mandate). In times of austerity and budget cuts, or
in times of abundance, aggregate cost-benefit analysis alone cannot inform decisions about where to cut or invest the next budget
dollar.
This is not to suggest that aggregate cost-benefit analysis is
useless. It provides valuable insights and information about the
total social costs and benefits flowing from a specific environmental-protection measure, such as a particulate emission
standard, and informs the return on investment from the measure. It may shed light on whether a proposed measure is worth
undertaking, but does not inform decisions to invest among intermediate products—that is, whether marginal increases
should go to regulation, enforcement, education, industry training, or a different institution altogether. 142
such as the precise measures of environmental quality (including how the issue
is framed) and questions of how environmental degradation is distributed. See,
e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law,
37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1353 (1985) (lauding tradable pollution-permit regimes
over command-and-control regimes to achieve environmental goals, on the
ground that the former vest the important decision of how much overall pollution should be allowed with the legislature, thus enhancing democracy); Cass R.
Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 636 (same); Cass R.
Sunstein, Democratizing America Through Law, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 949,
967 (1991) (same); Nash & Revesz, supra note 81, at 579–80 (discussing the
relationship between dispersion of pollutants and environmental justice concerns).
142. To analyze budget cutting, we would need to assess the impact on environmental quality from a one percent budget cut versus a five percent budget
cut. Knowing that the total social costs of a program on the chopping block are
X and the total social benefits are Y will not answer these questions, except in
the unlikely case in which the return on budget investment is constant across
the entire production function from the first budget dollar to any sized budget.
For example, if an EPA enforcement program were shown to have aggregate
social benefits twice those of social costs, this would be a positive sign about the
program’s overall effectiveness. But this would not necessarily mean that investing more in the agency’s enforcement program budget is a good decision. It
is entirely possible that most of the environmental quality gains could have been
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Federal and state agencies collect mountains of data on environmental quality and conduct comprehensive cost-benefit
analyses, 143 but almost never consider marginal return on the
dollar. This type of analysis is commonplace in private organizations but is exceedingly rare in the public sector. That needs to
change, and will require developing a more robust production
function. It may be possible, for example, to extend the kind of
empirical inquiry we have started to derive more granular data
about budget returns. For example, comparing the historical
budgets of multiple state water- or air-quality programs against
movements in relative environmental-quality indicators could
begin to provide more insight than is possible in a singleagency/single-medium study like ours.
History provides a useful guide. Sophisticated cost-benefit
analysis is now a routine part of administrative decision-making. But this is a fairly recent development. The method was
originally developed in the 1930s to assess water infrastructure
projects by the Army Corps of Engineers. 144 Its use expanded in
the 1970s with President Nixon’s quality of life reviews,145 President Ford’s requirement that agencies produce inflation impact
statements, 146 and President Carter’s Executive Order (EO)
12044. 147 The methodology became firmly implanted in regulatory processes when President Clinton initiated the regulatory
impact review (RIA) process in 1993 with his Executive Order
secured with a smaller budget investment in the first place and adding more
money yields little additional gain. Conversely, if the program were shown to
have costs twice those of benefits, this would not necessarily mean the program’s budget should not be reduced, as scaling back to a smaller program
budget could continue to produce most of the environmental quality benefits
and improve its cost-benefit profile.
143. See, e.g., Air Data: Air Quality Data Collected at Outdoor Monitors
Across the US, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/outdoor-air-quality-data (last updated
July 18, 2017) (containing an extensive amount of data).
144. See, e.g., Philip Shabecoff, Reagan Order on Cost-Benefit Analysis Stirs
Economic and Political Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1981, at 28 (discussing how
the Army Corps of Engineers has used cost-benefit analysis for many years).
145. See Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform,
65 TEX. L. REV. 1243, 1248 (1987).
146. See id.
147. Stuart Shapiro, The Evolution of Cost-Benefit Analysis in U.S. Regulatory Decisionmaking 3 (Jerusalem Papers in Regulation & Governance, Working Paper No. 5, 2010), http://regulation.huji.ac.il/papers/jp5.pdf (“[The Executive Order] required an economic analysis for any regulation with a likely
impact of more than $100 million. Agencies were required to choose ‘the least
burdensome of acceptable alternatives.’”).
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12,866.148 That executive order required that, when proposing a
“significant regulatory action,” which includes regulations having an impact on the economy of more than $100 million, 149
“[e]ach agency shall assess both the costs and the benefits of the
intended regulation and, recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a regulation only
upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended
regulation justify its costs.” 150 EO 12,866 also established within
OMB the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) as
the entity responsible for overseeing the RIA process. 151 OIRA
has over time issued a number of guidance documents for agencies engaging in RIAs. At present the RIA process is governed by
Circular A-4, which OIRA first issued in 2003. 152
The key point is that the methodology developed for assessing dams and levees would have proven woefully inadequate
in analyzing health or safety regulations. Yet cost-benefit analysis over the years has become increasingly sophisticated, such
that today it is routinely used in these settings and many others.
The same, we emphasize, can be done for the regulatory production function. Where to start? One of the limitations of our empirical study was the lack of consistent historical data that we
could use for regressions against environmental-quality
measures. It would be useful, therefore, if agencies and other institutions began compiling more comprehensive and granular
accounts of budget investments over time. As program budgets
scale up, are cut, or stay flat, agencies should monitor relevant
environmental-quality indicators and conduct analyses like
ours. And as institutions design new intermediate products, perhaps by leveraging emerging technologies such as big data or
machine learning, research should be conducted from inception

148. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993), https://
www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12866.pdf. President Clinton’s order replaced several orders President Reagan had issued regarding the use of cost-benefit analysis in federal agency rulemakings. Id. § 11.
President Reagan’s orders, although influential and controversial at the time,
are no longer in effect and provide none of the legal authority for the modern
RIA process.
149. Id. § 2(f ).
150. Id. § 1(b)(6).
151. Id. § 2(b).
152. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4 (Sept. 17, 2003), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf (refining the previous “best practices” RIA guide).
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to track its costs and to detect shifts in the relevant environmental-quality metrics. Better yet, experiments could be conducted
to provide a more controlled research environment. For example,
inspections at water polluting facilities could be boosted in one
watershed compared to another similar watershed and changes
in water quality measured.
The work of James Hamilton and Kip Viscusi is instructive
in this regard. Hamilton and Viscusi critiqued EPA’s approach
of requiring hazardous-waste sites to be cleaned to allow for all
possible future uses. 153 Instead, they argued that the standard
to which such sites should be clean should take into account only
likely future uses. 154 In other words, it was error for the agency
not to consider the marginal return on the funds invested in
cleanups.
In short, our message is to begin tracking the data necessary
to refine our understanding of the marginal returns to the
agency’s goal from investments in budgets of different institutions and their intermediate products. Of course, designing such
research can be challenging and resource intensive: the baseline
must be established, other possible factors such as pollutant
transport and economic fluctuations accounted for, and conditions carefully monitored and measured. Different lag times between budget investment and changes in the measure of the
agency goal will complicate assessment of any one program and
comparisons across programs. And the ultimate conundrum is
that, particularly in times of austerity and budget cuts, new
budgets for this kind of research—indeed, even for generating
and collecting new data—could be hard to come by. But even
those in favor of cutting budgets ought to appreciate the benefits
of funding research to inform which budgets to cut and by how
much! The point, however, is that no research of this kind is being conducted at all, at least none that has been reported. Just
as happened with cost-benefit analysis, these tools need to be
153. See James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, Human Health Risk Assessments for Superfund, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 573, 608–10 (1994) (critiquing EPA’s
policy of requiring cleanup of Superfund sites based on all possible future uses
of sites rather than eliminating future risks by imposing land use restrictions
and containment).
154. See James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, The Benefits and Costs of
Regulatory Reforms for Superfund, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 159, 167–71 (1997)
(arguing in favor of determining appropriate Superfund remediation strategies
based upon cost-benefit analysis of sites that would focus on health risk continued contamination would pose to current residents).
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developed from a rudimentary starting point if there is to be any
meaningful traction on the higher-level questions that follow.
b. Complex Adaptive System Models

Looking to the future, we believe that an advanced regulatory production function could be further refined by complexity
science. The focus of complexity science is complex adaptive systems, “in which large networks of components with no central
control and simple rules of operation give rise to complex collective behavior, sophisticated information processing, and adaptation via learning or evolution.” 155 Complexity scientists are particularly interested in studying how robust a complex adaptive
system is to external disturbances. 156 How will a forest ecosystem respond to an invasive insect species? How will a transportation network respond to adding or removing a component, such
as a highway or bridge?
Complex adaptive systems tend to exhibit extensive pathways of nonlinear behavior, making prediction of perturbation
impacts no easy task, but it must be a focus of study for policyrelevant systems if we hope to competently manage them. One
focus of complexity science is the study of systemic risk, which
can lead to local or global cascading failures. 157 Complexity science is influential across an array of social science disciplines,

155. MELANIE MITCHELL, COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR 13 (2009). “Complex
adaptive system” is used to distinguish between complex systems that are
highly adaptive (e.g., an ecosystem) versus nonadaptive (e.g., a hurricane).
156. See LANCE H. GUNDERSON & C.S. HOLLING, PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATION IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 25–63 (2002).
157. See J.B. Ruhl, Managing Systemic Risk in Legal Systems, 89 IND. L.J.
559, 562–63 (2014) (describing systemic risks and their cascading failures).
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including economics, 158 political science,159 sociology, 160 and international affairs.161 It also has been applied in the study of a
158. See, e.g., ERIC D. BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH: EVOLUTION,
COMPLEXITY, AND THE RADICAL REMAKING OF ECONOMICS 289–91 (Hollis
Heimbouch ed., 2006) (describing how local dynamics and interactions between
agents throughout business hierarchies will result in larger actions in the physical world relating to budgets, products, and marketing); PAUL KRUGMAN, THE
SELF-ORGANIZING ECONOMY 32 (1996) (“Phase space representations of dynamic systems are extremely common modern economic analysis.”); Didier Sornette & Ryan Woodard, Financial Bubbles, Real Estate Bubbles, Derivative Bubbles, and the Financial and Economic Crisis, in ECONOPHYSICS APPROACHES TO
LARGE-SCALE BUSINESS DATA AND FINANCIAL CRISIS 101, 138 (Misako Takayasu et al. eds., 2010) (stating that the cause of financial crises is the interaction
and mutual reinforcement of multiple economic bubbles); Neil Johnson &
Thomas Lux, Financial Systems: Ecology and Economics, 469 NATURE 302, 303
(2011) (criticizing a model which focuses on individual optimization because it
ignores complex interactions and fails to consider systemic risk factors).
159. See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION:
AGENT-BASED MODELS OF COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION 148–51 (Philip
W. Anderson et al. eds., 1997) (utilizing complexity science to understand how
nations and cultures emerge); ROBERT JERVIS, SYSTEM EFFECTS: COMPLEXITY
IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE 266–72 (1997) (describing the Domino Theory
Paradox, in which small domestic defeats can generate widespread policy implications and impact the global perception of a country); SCOTT DE MARCHI, COMPUTATIONAL AND MATHEMATICAL MODELING IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 156–64
(2005) (framing encoding preferences as adaptive landscapes to represent aggregated voting preferences); Michael J. Ensley et al., District Complexity as an
Advantage in Congressional Elections, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 990, 996–98 (2009)
(determining that the unpredictable nature of complex districts benefits incumbents by deterring challengers from entering); Scott E. Page, Path Dependence,
1 Q.J. POL. SCI. 87, 103–05 (2006) (suggesting that voting processes today are
dependent upon the processes and paths of early and recent history).
160. See, e.g., R. KEITH SAWYER, SOCIAL EMERGENCE: SOCIETIES AS COMPLEX SYSTEMS 3–4 (2005) (using the process of language shift to demonstrate
how simple rules and interactions at the local level can give rise to collective
behavior); Elizabeth E. Bruch & Robert D. Mare, Neighborhood Choice and
Neighborhood Change, 112 AM. J. SOC. 667, 669–70 (2006) (examining neighborhood segregation with complexity science to demonstrate that “aggregate
outcomes may be quite sensitive to . . . assumptions at the micro level”); Elinor
Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 137, 153 (2000) (stating that external threats such as migration and
market changes will impact the norms of trust and reciprocity in self-organized
regimes).
161. See, e.g., WALTER C. CLEMENS JR., COMPLEXITY SCIENCE AND WORLD
AFFAIRS 71–72 (2013) (applying insights from complexity science to understand
the divergent outcomes of successor states following the collapse of communist
regimes across Eurasia); Robert Axelrod, The Dissemination of Culture: A Model
with Local Convergence and Global Polarization, 41 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 203,
207–11 (1997) (utilizing complexity science to explain the development of cultural regions); Lars-Erik Cederman, Modeling the Size of Wars: From Billiard
Balls to Sandpiles, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 135, 144–45 (2003) (identifying conflict-generating factors within complex systems that can lead to war).
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wide variety of policy challenges such as terrorist networks, 162
organized crime, 163 transportation systems,164 urban growth, 165
and national security. 166
One of the systems most relevant to EPA’s mission—the environment—is also widely recognized and studied as a complex
adaptive system. 167 Understanding how subjecting an environment to more pollution or more land development—which, in es-

162. See, e.g., E. Ahmed et al., On Complex Adaptive Systems and Terrorism,
337 PHYSICS LETTERS A 127, 127 (2005) (applying aspects of complex adaptive
systems to terrorism to determine that the complete eradication of terrorism is
“highly unlikely”); Antoine Bousquet, Complexity Theory and the War on Terror:
Understanding the Self-Organising Dynamics of Leaderless Jihad, 15 J. INT’L
REL. & DEV. 345, 360–61 (2012) (explaining that a decentralized, bottom-up
structure allows terrorist networks to better plan and execute complex operations such as September 11); Vito Latora & Massimo Marchiori, How the Science
of Complex Networks Can Help Developing Strategies Against Terrorism, 20
CHAOS, SOLITONS & FRACTALS 69, 73–74 (2004) (demonstrating how complex
systems science may be used to disrupt terrorism by identifying “critical components” in the terrorist network).
163. See, e.g., Paul A. C. Duijn et al., The Relative Ineffectiveness of Criminal
Network Disruption, in 4 SCIENTIFIC REPORTS 1, 1–2 (2014), https://www
.nature.com/articles/srep04238.pdf (describing criminal networks as complex
adaptive systems and identifying strategies to disrupt these networks).
164. See, e.g., A. Aw & M. Rascle, Resurrection of “Second Order ” Models of
Traffic Flow, 60 SIAM J. APPLIED MATHEMATICS 916, 931–33 (2000) (examining
the effects of perturbations on the stability of traffic flow); Debashish Chowdhury et al., Statistical Physics of Vehicular Traffic and Some Related Systems,
329 PHYSICS REP. 199, 213 (2000) (stating that the “unsystematic” behavior of
traffic is a reflection of the dynamics of the vehicles in a traffic jam); Petter
Holme, Congestion and Centrality in Traffic Flow on Complex Networks, 6 ADVANCES COMPLEX SYSTEMS 163, 174 (2003) (stating that when estimating traffic congestion in one region, one must also consider aspects of the neighboring
regions); Bosiljka Tadić et al., Traffic on Complex Networks: Towards Understanding Global Statistical Properties from Microscopic Density Fluctuations,
69 PHYSICAL REV. E 036102-1, 036102-4 (2004) (stating that “[t]here is a robustness in the [traffic] system in the sense that minor changes to the query discipline or buffer sizes do not lead to a qualitative difference”); Bosiljka Tadić et
al., Transport on Complex Networks: Flow, Jamming and Optimization, 17
INT’L J. BIFURCATION & CHAOS 2363, 2374–77 (2007) (identifying underlying
indicators that give rise to complex inefficiencies in the system).
165. See, e.g., Robert H. Samet et al., Complexity, the Science of Cities and
Long-Range Futures, 47 FUTURES 49, 56–57 (2013).
166. See, e.g., Jürgen Scheffran, The Complexity of Security, 14 COMPLEXITY
13, 15–17 (2008).
167. SIMON LEVIN, FRAGILE DOMINION: COMPLEXITY AND THE COMMONS 12–
15 (1999) (describing the features of a complex adaptive system and how those
are illustrated in ecosystems).
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sence, are external perturbations—necessarily implicates complex adaptive systems analysis.168 The regulatory production
function can be usefully analyzed as a complex adaptive system,
as well. The description of the regulatory production function in
Part III certainly maps well onto the complex adaptive systems
model: (1) a diverse network of interconnected actors is in motion; (2) no single central control mechanism dictates system behavior; (3) how any intermediate product performs depends on a
multitude of factors both internal and external to the defined
system; and (4) over time the system adapts and evolves. Budget
cuts (or increases) are, in a very real sense, perturbations to this
system.
Hence it would be incomplete to use complexity science to
improve our understanding of only one of the coupled systems in
the budget-outcomes analysis—the environment—while treating the regulatory production function as some form of nonlinear
system subject to study exclusively through conventional statistical computation methods.169 Indeed, legal scholars have begun
to employ complexity science as one lens through which to probe
descriptive and normative questions about legal system complexity. 170 Legal complexity theorists have focused on mapping
the legal system’s complexity by examining how each attribute
of complex adaptive systems described in complexity science research finds close parallel in legal system structure and behavior. There have been numerous such accounts of how complex
adaptive system attributes appear in a broad range of legal systems including administrative law, 171 mediation and alternative

168. Simon A. Levin et al., Social-Ecological Systems as Complex Adaptive
Systems: Modeling and Policy Implications, 18 ENV’T. & DEV. ECON. 111, 113–
14 (2013).
169. J.B. Ruhl, Daniel Martin Katz & Michael J. Bommarito II, Harnessing
Legal Complexity, 355 SCIENCE 1377, 1377 (2017).
170. For an overview of complexity science and how scholars in the social
sciences, including law, have integrated it, see J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A
Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 885 (2008).
171. See Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 913 (2005).
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dispute resolution, 172 bankruptcy law, 173 environmental law, 174
business law, 175 international law, 176 land-use regulation law, 177
intellectual property law, 178 international development law, 179
regulation of the internet, 180 the law of war,181 health law, 182 and
telecommunications regulation. 183
Of course, the regulatory agency budget-outcomes production function model encompasses more than just a legal system.
Its law component is embedded within a larger system involving
politics, the economy, and the environment, all of which also
could be described as complex adaptive systems. Researchers
172. See Robert A. Creo, Mediation 2004: The Art and the Artist, 108 PENN.
ST. L. REV. 1017 (2004); Arthur B. Pearlstein, The Justice Bazaar: Dispute Resolution Through Emergent Private Ordering as a Superior Alternative to Authoritarian Court Bureaucracy, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 739 (2007).
173. See Bernard Trujillo, Patterns in a Complex System: An Empirical
Study of Valuation in Business Bankruptcy Cases, 53 UCLA L. REV. 357 (2005);
Bernard Trujillo, Self-Organizing Legal Systems: Precedent and Variation in
Bankruptcy, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 483 (2004).
174. See Gerald Andrews Emison, The Potential for Unconventional Progress: Complex Adaptive Systems and Environmental Quality Policy, 7 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 167 (1996).
175. See Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and Coevolution: The Web of
Law, Management Theory, and Law Related Services at the Millennium, 65
TENN. L. REV. 925 (1998).
176. See Mark D. Belcher & James W. Newton, International Legal Development: A Complex Problem Deserving of a “Complex” Solution and Implications
for the CAFTA Region, 12 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 189 (2006); Rakhyun E. Kim &
Brendan Mackey, International Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System, 14 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS 5 (2013).
177. See John R. Nolon, Champions of Change: Reinventing Democracy
Through Land Law Reform, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2006).
178. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Organizational Code: A Complexity Theory
Perspective on Technology and Intellectual Property Regulation, 11 J. TECH. L.
& POL’Y xiii (2006); Deborah Tussey, Music at the Edge of Chaos: A Complex
Systems Perspective on File Sharing, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 147 (2005).
179. See Belcher & Newton, supra note 176.
180. See Susan P. Crawford, Shortness of Vision: Regulatory Ambition in the
Digital Age, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 695 (2005); David G. Post & David R. Johnson,
“Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent”: Towards a New Theory of Decentralized
Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055 (1998).
181. See Carla Crandall, If You Can’t Beat Them, Kill Them: Complex Adaptive Systems Theory and the Rise in Targeted Killing, 43 SETON HALL L. REV.
595 (2013).
182. See M. Gregg Bloche, The Emergent Logic of Health Law, 82 S. CAL. L.
REV. 389 (2009).
183. See Barbara A. Cherry, The Telecommunications Economy and Regulation as Coevolving Complex Adaptive Systems: Implications for Federalism, 59
FED. COMM. L.J. 369 (2007); Susan P. Crawford, The Biology of the Broadcast
Flag, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 603 (2003).
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from a broad variety of fields increasingly are exploring how
these systems of systems policy challenges can be better understood through complexity science models. For example, the National Academy of Sciences recently described the diverse economic, physical, social, and policy dynamics that drive the vast
conglomerate food system as a complex adaptive system, 184 and
financial policy researchers have proposed using complexity science models to better design policy responses to systemic risk in
the financial system. 185
Following those leads, we believe it would be useful, even in
the early stages of empirical research, to view the budget-outcomes dynamic through the lens of complexity science and to
think of budget cuts (or increases) as external perturbations.
While we are not currently able to build out a complete system
model, our point is that the goal should be to develop this kind
of deeper understanding of the system and initiate a research
agenda with that goal in mind. Just as with improving marginal
analysis methodologies, complexity systems models will require
more robust datasets regarding public and private regulatory investments and the outcomes those investments are intended to
produce. Given the substantial advancements in data collection,
management, and analytics that have been made in the last decade, progress seems likely to continue.
2. Assessing and Maintaining Resilience
In addition to modeling and measuring budget yield, one
particular intermediate product—resilience—warrants special
attention because it raises different analytic challenges.
Investment in maintaining resilience of infrastructure—
whether highway bridges or a metro system or public governance—rarely provides an obvious and immediate return on the
dollar, but failing to invest will eventually take its toll. Collapse
can be nonlinear—a function of systemic risk reaching the breaking point—and repair efforts might come too late to avoid a cas-

184. INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A FRAMEWORK FOR ASEFFECTS OF THE FOOD SYSTEM 6–7 (Malden C. Nesheim et al. eds.,
2015).
185. Stefano Battiston et al., Complexity Theory and Financial Regulation,
351 SCIENCE 818, 818 (2016).
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cade of failure. The bridge may work fine until it collapses. Resilience thus is a complex adaptive system’s front-line defense
against system failure. 186
From this vantage, both Terry Anderson and the environmental groups decrying budget cuts could be correct. It may be
the case that reduced agency funding has little direct correlation
to measures of environmental quality but a close correlation to
individual pollution disasters.
Since the early 2000s, there has been an explosion of theory
and research on the theme of organizational resilience in the
business enterprise context. 187 There has also been a rising interest in agencies like EPA on how they can promote resilience
in environmental quality. 188 Only recently, however, has the resilience goal been directed at public agencies themselves—how
to make and keep them resilient. 189 Notwithstanding privatization rhetoric, the public quickly turns to agencies like EPA, and
not generally to the private sector, to (1) protect against failures
like the Flint drinking-water crisis; and (2) respond when they
occur with return on the dollar not the primary concern. Further
research is needed on what supports and sustains regulatory
agency resilience. In particular, there must be greater focus on
calculating the baseline investments needed to ensure resilience
as well as ways to assess this measure within agencies. This is a
nascent field but with important research payoffs.
3. Evaluating and Comparing Intermediate Products
A key feature of the regulatory production function will be
the assessment of intermediate products—specifically, identifying which intermediate goods are most important to environmental quality. From a historical perspective, there may be
much to learn from EPA’s strategic response to congressional
186. See Ruhl, supra note 157, at 563.
187. See generally Ran Bhamra et al., Resilience: The Concept, A Literature
Review and Future Directions, 49 INT’L J. PRODUCTION RES. 5375 (2011) (describing resilience scholarship across several fields).
188. See, e.g., Melinda Harm Benson & Ahjond S. Garmestani, Can We Manage for Resilience? The Integration of Resilience Thinking into Natural Resource
Management in the United States, 48 ENVTL. MGMT. 392, 395 (2011), https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1200&context=
usepapapers.
189. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems – With Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1401 (2011).
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zero-budgeting strategies. In order to maintain agency effectiveness, which activities were protected and which felt the brunt of
budget cuts? The converse of this analysis is worth considering,
as well. Which aspects of environmental quality are most at risk
from which types of reduced EPA activity, and which are less
vulnerable to backsliding?
Part of this research would focus on those agency products
that most depend on nonsubstitutable options. In other words,
certain agency resources can be substituted with private or market resources in periods of austerity (such as agency enforcement
by citizen suits), while others cannot as easily (such as regulation development). Likewise, for substitutable intermediate
products, which option is most effective?
Once again, data will be critical. With access to more data
comes the possibility of more focused and calibrated statistical
analyses. Ideally, for example, one might deploy two regressions:
one to measure how funding (as an input) affects generation of
an intermediate product, and a second to measure how units of
the intermediate product affects the ultimate policy goal. The
full analysis would shed light on how funding—as filtered
through the chosen intermediate product—affects the ultimate
policy goal. 190
While we have argued that greater accumulation and analysis of quantitative data would help answer these questions, researchers might find qualitative analysis useful as well. As described above, agency officials over time have likely developed
strategies for responding to budget changes, and been forced to
do so when faced with budget cuts. Even if these strategies are
based on anecdotal evidence, it would be helpful to know how
agencies in fact make these decisions under conditions of limited
access to data.
4. Allocating Among Institutional Actors
The preceding research projects have focused primarily on
the agency. Congress, too, would benefit from a more developed
regulatory production function. There is a great deal of scholarship on specific policies of institutions, whether cap-and-trade,
product certification, taxes, et cetera, as well as case studies of

190. We are grateful to Elizabeth Anderson for this suggestion.
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their application.191 There has been remarkably little consideration, though, over how to allocate among the institutional actors
undertaking these initiatives. Which institution does a better job
at production?
Armed with a better handle on which intermediate products
provide the best return and which institutions are most capable
and efficient at producing them, macro-level research could
begin to focus on broader comparisons of overall institutional
performance over time. We anticipate that there remain today
many high-yield options that represent low-hanging fruit. For
example, the EPA might be more efficient at providing educational materials, but industry more efficient at providing training.
Private governance initiatives, such as contractual supplychain control,192 are relatively new, but can yield significant
gains in environmental quality. We have learned a lot about the
private certification of forest products and which programs are
more effective than others, for example,193 but we still know little about the appropriate balance between private certification
programs and public regulation of forests. Research could be devoted to identifying such opportunities and tracking investment
and returns.
Over time, of course, as an institution’s low-hanging fruit is
picked off, the overall marginal yield of further investment in
that institution should fall and eventually level off. Indeed, this
may be precisely what has happened with EPA—why its budget
and environmental quality do not appear correlated in any significant way. It may be that over time different institutions level
off at different marginal yields, which could help guide investment decisions going forward. Institutions with persistently
lower marginal yields could then begin experimentation with
new, innovative intermediate products and production methods
which, if they produce high marginal yields, would be a focal
point for new budget investment. Research as to which institutional actors have the best innovation track record can support
191. See, e.g., Nash & Revesz, supra note 81, at 582–614 (providing a case
study of tradeable air-pollution emission-permit regimes).
192. See, e.g., Vandenbergh, supra note 85, at 147 (discussing how “private
supply chain contracts” sometimes “include provisions that are designed to reduce the environmental harms arising from the suppliers’ operations”).
193. See, e.g., Susan E. Moore, Frederick Cubbage & Celia Eicheldinger, Impacts of Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and Sustainable Forestry Initiative
(SFI) Forest Certification in North America, 110 J. FORESTRY 79 (2012).
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that investment decision as well. Again, cost-benefit analysis
cannot produce the information needed to guide these kinds of
decisions. This is not easily done, to be sure, but of fundamental
importance in a world of scarce resources.
CONCLUSION
While difficult to study, the relationship between regulatory
agency funding and regulatory benefit outcomes is a research
area of fundamental importance, raising questions that bear on
major issues of public debate and regulatory design. Importantly, while our focus has been on the environment, our
larger point holds true for any agency whose mission centers on
improvement of social welfare. Developing methods to measure
budget yield, assessing and maintaining resilience, evaluating
and comparing intermediate products, and allocating between
institutional actors are no less relevant for OSHA, the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Department of Health and
Human Services, as for EPA. This Article’s exploration of the issues and promising research topics provides a foundation upon
which future scholarship can build.

